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ABSTRACT 
This study uses party platforms to assess the degree of independence between 
state and national political parties in the United States in light of issue ownership theory 
and morality politics. Utilizing a coding scheme adapted from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project, I analyze the ideology and content of 80 Democratic and Republican 
state party platforms from 2008-2010. 
I uncover substantial variations among state party platforms and findings suggest 
that state parties manage to maintain a significant level of independence from the 
national parties. Some of the findings suggest our current understanding of state party 
politics is inadequate. For example, contrary to expectations, Republican state party 
platforms show more ideological variation than their Democratic counterparts. In 
contrast to national patterns, Democratic state party platforms conform more 
consistently with issue ownership theory than their Republican counterparts. And 
Democratic state party platforms are significantly more likely to balance their 
progressive policy preferences with conservative party interests. 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Red folks are NASCAR-lovin’, gun-ownin’, God-fearin’ Republicans 
who mostly inhabit the rural, suburban, and small-town heartland 
stretching from the Deep South through the Great Plains and into the 
mountain states. Blue types, by contrast, are highly secular, latte-sipping, 
diversity-embracing Democrats concentrated in the urban areas on the 
two coasts and around the Great Lakes.1  
When most Americans think about political parties, they think about national 
parties. The quotation above offers a stereotypical portrait of parties in America – one 
that is flattering to neither party. If this is how popular culture views parties based upon 
caricatures of the national organizations, some of the assumptions held regarding 
Democrats and Republicans may be seriously flawed. What it means to be typical differs 
in New Jersey, Montana, and Alabama. The meanings of liberal and conservative change 
from Mississippi to Massachusetts. As such, variation in state parties should not come as 
a surprise. 
Academics have studied American political parties for decades, but have failed to 
account fully for their impact, in part, because the focus is limited too often to national 
parties. There are not two American parties headquartered in D.C., but 102 parties 
scattered across the country. Focusing disproportionately at the national level provides 
only a superficial understanding of the importance of political parties. By not digging 
deeper, by discounting the behavior of state parties, our theories remain tentative and 
our conclusions incomplete. Discovering how state political parties behave is critically 
                                                     
1
 Jay Tolson, “How Deep the Divide?” US News & World Report, October 24, 2004 42-50. 
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important to understanding the American party system. To what degree do state parties 
behave independently of the national party that shares their name? What issues do 
state parties care about? How do parties under the same partisan banner vary across 
the country, and what difference do these deviations make? If there is variation in party 
values and interests across states and between national and state parties, we need to 
know what they are to fully understand what the labels Democrat and Republican mean.  
The quotation above suggests that there are substantial differences between the 
major American parties linked to distinct sets of priorities and regions. Survey and 
election results corroborate the claims, in part, but the observation neglects the 
relevance of state party organizations. I employ issue ownership theory and morality 
politics to assess state party platforms in an effort to understand better the degree to 
which state parties behave independently of their national counterparts. This analysis is 
an essential step towards a more complete understanding of the role of parties in the 
United States.  
Issue ownership theory suggests that parties will focus on policy areas voters 
assume they are most capable of handling.  For example, the Republican Party is 
generally perceived as more capable of controlling crime and the Democratic Party is 
seen as better suited for environmental protection, thus the parties are expected to 
focus on the issues they have an advantage on. These perceptions of party competence 
extend across elections and are not linked directly to specific candidates; rather these 
are the relative advantages the parties have at the onset of an election due to the pre-
existing expectations of voters. Issue ownership theory was developed at the national 
3 
level to explain party behavior. Although frequently tested in national elections and 
applied to campaigns for state office, this is among the first direct applications of issue 
ownership to state parties. This is an important step to understanding the behavior of 
state parties.  
In this project I examine how state party platforms tackle morality policies. 
Morality politics involves those issues that address the legal sanctioning of a particular 
set of values. These issues are tightly linked to core principles, are technically simple, are 
highly salient, and often spark intense policy debates. The proper role of religion in the 
public sphere, gay rights, stem cell research, and abortion policy are all examples of 
morality policies. Policies falling into this category are expected to inspire a set of 
political behaviors distinct from those stimulated by economic issues. In addition, issue 
ownership theory expects Republicans to address issues of morality politics more often 
than their Democratic counterparts because upholding traditional morality is seen as a 
Republican strength. However, the high saliency of morality policies places tremendous 
pressure on Democrats to address these issues as well. If we have “God-fearin’” 
Republicans and “highly secular” Democrats, what does this mean for discussions of 
public policy related to core moral principles? I assess how state party platforms address 
morality politics and compare the treatment of these issues between the national and 
state levels.  
My objective is to assess state party platforms in light of issue ownership theory 
and morality politics for insights into the role of state parties in the American party 
system. This is an immense task to undertake. One of the most challenging aspects of 
4 
state-level research is the collection and organization of data. States’ interest in and 
capacity to collect information that is comparable nationally varies. Officially compiled 
data from state agencies are often produced in various formats using inconsistent 
definitions and methodologies. Moreover, the professionalism of state legislatures vary 
widely, bureaucratic discretion and competency differs dramatically, and the public 
availability of complied data is uneven. If the complications from formal institutional 
limitations were not enough, each state party is an independent entity accountable to 
no higher authority. The national parties do not control the behavior of the state 
parties, the rhetoric of state party members, or the candidates running under the party 
name. 
Despite the inherent difficulties, there are ways to uncover the values, goals, and 
behavior of state political parties. One way to assess state parties is to look at the 
official documents they produce. Official outputs expose parties’ priorities and provide 
insights into how they perceive their political environment. Nearly all state parties 
maintain websites, although the quality, content, and updating patterns vary 
dramatically, and it is often unclear who controls the site. Many state parties regularly 
engage in mailing campaigns during election seasons and others actively engage 
members in fundraising campaigns and social events. Yet, official state party outputs are 
irregular and often difficult to compare. Fortunately, platforms serve as the public face 
of the parties and offer a window into the role state parties play in the American 
political system. A platform is a formal declaration of principles and policy preferences 
adopted by a political party. While the internal structure and content of platforms vary, 
5 
each addresses a collection of issues salient to the party and expresses the party’s 
values and policy preferences. Unlike many other behaviors, most state parties compose 
party platforms, just as their national counterparts do, and this provides an ideal tool in 
the investigation of the role of state parties in the American party system. 
State Party Platforms as Demonstrations of Independence 
Despite their limited resources, 80 percent of state political parties opt to 
develop unique state party platforms, rather than simply adopting the platform of their 
national counterpart. Because state parties elect to spend their limited resources 
drafting and gathering support for their own platform, it suggests that at least some 
state parties feel that their interests are not fully or accurately reflected in the national 
platforms. National platforms need to appeal nationally to a large and diverse 
constituency, whereas the audiences for state party platforms are smaller and more 
homogeneous. Moreover, the state political environment may not be favorable to some 
national planks. When state political interests have more extremist policy preferences, 
they may feel that the national party platform does not take strong enough stances. 
Conversely, more moderate or competitive states may find that the national party 
platforms are too severe in their policy stances. In either case, by developing their own 
platforms, state parties are able to articulate policy preferences that are more in line 
with the current political environment of the state.  
Despite the open availability of state party platforms, these documents receive 
virtually no news coverage and little scholarly attention. In part, this is not surprising. 
News is big business and the media’s preference for sexy, dramatic material is well 
6 
documented (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, for starters). Although less sexy than other 
political sources, platforms do provide ample material for a compelling story. Within 
state party platforms we can see both extreme policy positions and stances so weak as 
to utter the party’s position meaningless. Moreover, platforms often demonstrate 
intense focus on some issues while completely ignoring others. Analysis of these 
patterns offers a glimpse of the parties’ hearts, exposing parties’ values and policy 
priorities. It is from here that we can develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
role and independence of state parties. 
Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 introduces state party platforms and explores their purpose and 
development. Although state parties have been drafting platforms for decades, they 
consistently receive virtually no public or scholarly attention. While national party 
platforms are seldom highlighted, they attract significantly more scholarly interest and 
enjoy more public visibility. As a result, most are unaware state party platforms exist, 
few are privy to their substance, and almost no one has attempted to analyze their 
content systematically.  
In chapter 3 I describe the core data used in this analysis and provide a full list of 
platforms. I assess party platforms using traditional manual content analysis and detail 
the specific coding procedures employed. Researchers on the Comparative Manifesto 
Project have analyzed the content of party platforms for decades and in this study I 
utilize a coding scheme adapted from the one developed by the CMP. In this chapter I 
7 
also include a brief overview of state party platform content, along with comparisons to 
national party platforms.  
In chapter 4 I provide a general descriptive analysis of state party platforms, a 
necessary step because state party platforms are so poorly understood. This chapter 
discusses the length of party platforms and what we can learn from parties’ decisions to 
produce lengthy platforms. All of the exiting literature regarding state party platforms 
focuses on platform ideology, and I employ two separate ideology measures to 
determine the ideology of state party platforms in 2008-2010. I conclude chapter 4 by 
discussing patterns and lessons from state party platform ideology. 
In chapter 5 I use state party platforms to assess issue ownership theory. Issue 
ownership sets up a series of expectations for party behavior; however, few attempts 
have been made to test the theory directly using state party behavior. Results indicate 
that state parties do, in fact, adhere to the general expectations of issue ownership 
theory, although some of the results run contrary to national-level findings, suggesting 
interesting patterns of state party independence. 
In chapter 6 I examine the values, rhetoric, and behavior of state party platforms 
on a specific subset of policies known as morality policies. The high salience of morality 
policies makes this a good policy area to begin deeper analysis of platform content. In 
addition, much policy movement on these issues occurs at the state level, further 
inviting deviation from national platforms. Findings highlight significant differences 
among the parties at the state level as well as dramatic deviations of state party 
platforms from national platforms.  
8 
Finally, in chapter 7 I wrap up this analysis and provide an overview of my 
findings. I include a discussion of the significance of these findings and offer suggestions 
for future research.  
  
9 
CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
Republicans are very good at describing things in black and white; 
Democrats are very good at describing the 11 shades of gray.2 
Despite the conservative nature of the state, the 2004 Arkansas Democratic 
Party platform forcefully advocated for the legalization of gay marriage. When the 
committee met to draft the party’s 2006 platform, they chose to remove the pro-gay 
marriage plank in its entirety, eliminating all mention of sexual orientation. While state 
party platforms receive relatively little media attention, without the involvement of the 
local media, the plank’s removal might have gone unnoticed. Although the debate at the 
convention centered on the platform’s treatment of immigration, the media focused on 
the removal of the gay rights plank. The reaction to the removal of the gay rights plank 
ignited took the platform chair by surprise. In some respects, this may be surprising. 
After all, morality policies are highly salient technically simple. Gay marriage was a 
frequent topic of discussion in the 2004 general election on the national stage and a 
contentious issue in the state of Arkansas. On the other hand, Arkansas Democrats on 
the platform committee recognized that in 2006 the political climate did not support a 
strong gay rights position and felt that the state had effectively settled the gay marriage 
issue less than two years prior with the passage of a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting same-sex marriage. Little could be accomplished by including a forceful gay 
rights plank, but there was ample opportunity for a strong plank to do the party 
                                                     
2
 Joseph C. Wilson, US Diplomat. 
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damage. This internal struggle to decide what Arkansas Democrats stand for combines 
the forces of individual committee members, elected officials with their own agendas, 
party activists, public expectations and the news media. Consistent with the national 
Democratic Party, in 2004 Arkansas Democrats stood firmly in support of gay rights, but 
quickly shifted to apparent indifference just two short years later. The decision was 
made strategically, with little consideration for possible emotional blowback.  
This process repeats itself every two years in 100 state parties across the United 
States. Each summer groups crowd around wooden conference tables to hash out what 
it means to be a Republican/Democrat of the great state of ________ , just as the 
founding fathers hashed out a Constitution – albeit with the luxury of air conditioning.  
If these state party platforms have no meaning, no importance, then no one 
would surrender their time to such an inconsequential task. The existence of so many 
state party platforms and the exertion necessary for their cultivation suggests they serve 
a purpose and hold real value. Despite the insight these platforms might provide and 
their importance to state parties, no one has ever given these documents more than a 
cursory look. I intend to remedy this oversight. 
The Relevance of State Political Parties 
It is not possible to understand the differences in the way sovereign states carry 
out the processes of government without understanding the type of party whose 
representatives are making the decisions that affect the health, education, and welfare 
of its citizens.3 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the United States has but two viable political 
parties. In a two-party system, other parties are intriguing, but hold very little political 
                                                     
3
 Morehouse, 1981, 29. 
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potential and we have just two political alternatives – Democrats and Republicans. 
While intuitive, this perception of the US as a strict two-party system is inaccurate and 
the reality of our party system is hidden behind the Democrat and Republican Party 
labels. Our federal system creates not just layers of government, but layers of parties 
and the organization, behavior, and values of parties vary greatly across the states, even 
when operating under a common party banner.  
The importance of states can be traced back to the Federalist Papers in which 
James Madison argues that the increased power of the national government in the 
proposed constitution would not pose a significant threat because of the peoples’ 
“natural attachment to their state governments” (Madison 1788). Yet, although our 
natural attachments were expected to link us to our states and despite the closeness of 
the states to the people, the public is simply not that interested in state politics or state 
government. Local government receives some attention because the leaders are 
members of the immediate community and the local consequences of policy are clear, 
but national politics is flashy, campaigns flush, and the policy implications broad. States 
are left out in the cold.  
History and current political environments converge to create party systems. 
Both factors contribute to the patterns of organization and behavior we witness today 
and because these factors change, “party systems evolve; they are not made” (Key 
1967, 218). The changing federal system is just one example of how evolving political 
environments spur party system changes. Federalism is the division of authority 
between levels of government, but the practice of federalism changes. Today, divisions 
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are less clear and there is heightened interdependence between the layers. With the 
passage of the 16th Amendment and the rise of the federal grants system, the national 
government expects states to implement federal policy and states increasingly rely on 
the federal government to close ever-widening budget gaps. As such, the role of parties 
in the federal system are evolving as the role states are beings asked to play changes. 
Repeated attempts to move towards devolution and government reforms resulted in a 
shift of federal social program implementation onto the states. As the role of the states 
expands, we must examine every level to understand fully the American party system. 
The degree to which state parties are able to operate independently of national 
parties is central to our understanding of the American party system. As V.O. Key wrote 
in 1967, “National issues, campaigns and parties project themselves into the affairs of 
the states” and while this is as true now as it was then, national projections only 
influence, they do not control, state outcomes. Maintaining independence from the 
national government and the national parties is a constant struggle for states, especially 
in the era of grants and the rise of the welfare state. In addition, the national parties 
have pushed for a greater degree of consistency between national and state parties. 
Observers screeched about the trend towards nationalization of political parties 
witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s and insisted that such trends would lead to 
ideological consolidation of state parties in line with national parties (Bibby 1979; 
Kayden 1980; Epstein 1982; Conway 1983; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Reichley 1985; 
Wekkin 1984, 1985; Frantzich 1986; Lunch 1987).  However difficult, state parties can 
actively push for independence from their national counterparts. Scheduling state 
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(especially gubernatorial) elections in off years can help distance state and national 
outcomes, for example (Key 1967; Cleary and Hertzke 2006). 
National parties work on a four year cycle where nearly all behavior is 
concentrated on presidential year races. While midterm congressional races are 
certainly important, they attract far less money, attention, and turnout. The political 
calendars of state parties, on the other hand, may be very different. While presidential 
year races are the highlight of political struggles, state parties oversee a variety of other 
races, including congressional elections, campaigns for governor (and other statewide 
executive offices), state legislature, state judicial positions, as well as a variety of ballot 
propositions. At the national level the parties want to win the White House, and gain 
control of at least one chamber of Congress. At the state level, the aims are far more 
varied. This means that the political environments state parties operate in are very 
different from what the national parties experience, and may be very different from one 
another. Not only do we not fully understand what state parties do on a regular basis, 
we do not know how these environmental differences impact party behavior. 
In addition to variation in policy preferences and values, state parties differ with 
regard to history, organization, and professionalism.4 Some state parties are well-staffed 
by competent professionals who maintain reliable records and run professional 
organizations. Other state parties, by contrast, rely almost entirely on activists and 
volunteers with little organizational experience. The record keeping systems of these 
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 Blair and Barth (2005) and Flentje and Aistrup (2010) provide solid updated descriptions of the political 
environments and party systems for Arkansas and Kansas. Although both states are perceived as 
conservative nationally, a deeper understanding of these states highlights state variations. 
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parties are far less dependable and the party activities less consistent. These differences 
in party organization and professionalism are linked to both history and contemporary 
political environments. I expect the age of the state party, the state’s attitude towards 
government and parties, the style of political leadership, and the competitiveness of the 
state to influence the organization and professionalism of state parties, as well as the 
prevalence and quality of state party platforms.5  
Even if we were satisfied with our limited knowledge of state parties, many of 
our conclusions are the result of very dated research. As states have been asked to take 
on increased responsibility for the implementation of federal policy and as the strength 
and role of political parties have been affected by electoral reforms, the roles of states 
and parties have likely changed in ways we do not yet understand. Some older studies 
of state parties include mentions of state party platforms, but their treatment has been 
limited. Key (1967) tells us that interest groups use platforms to gain insight into which 
party would grant them greater access and behave more consistently with their 
preferences. Morehouse (1981) suggests that governors take state party platforms 
seriously and intend to implement platform policies once in office. 
While our understanding of political parties has progressed significantly, we still 
have a relatively poor understanding of how state parties operate. State party platforms 
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 I contacted a number of state parties asking if they produced a platform in 2008 or 2010. The responses I 
received from official party contacts varied significantly. Some were quick to forward copies of their most 
recent platform, while others admitted they were not sure whether their party engaged in platform 
development. One party official indicated a platform existed, but referred me to the Republican National 
Committee. Other party contacts simply ignored information requests or referred me to the party website 
for platform information (platforms were not present on these website; I checked party websites before 
contacting any party officials directly). 
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are intrinsically interesting and provide insight into poorly understood state political 
parties.  This is where I will begin. 
The Purpose and Function of Party Platforms 
Before we can appreciate the content of state party platforms, it is necessary to 
understand their function. National and state political parties regularly compose and 
ratify party platforms that reflect the parties’ beliefs and policy agendas (Putnam and 
Campbell 2010; Wilcox and Robinson 2011). While voters rarely read party platforms in 
their entirety, the messages are transmitted to the electorate through media coverage, 
campaign materials, political advertisements, and campaign speeches (Erikson, 
Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Paddock 2005). Despite the potential of party platforms to 
provide insight into the American party system, relatively little research has taken 
advantage of the available data, and most studies have focused on the readily accessible 
national party platforms (Ginsberg 1972; 1976; Pomper 1967). Coffey’s (2011), Kidd’s 
(2008), and Paddock’s (2005) analyses of state party platforms in search of American 
party polarization are rare, notable examples of state party platform analysis. These 
studies are limited, however, by the authors’ exclusive focus on the platform’s ideology, 
rather than a more thorough analysis of content. Paddock’s (1991; 1992; 2005) focus on 
platform ideology in seven issue categories is more specific than Kidd’s (2008) or 
Coffey’s (2011) analyses. Yet, Paddock’s decision to code platforms with paragraphs 
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acting as the unit of analysis introduces considerable validity concerns.6 Paddock 
examined state party platforms for insight into state party polarization and intra-party 
integration. He found evidence of modest, but increasing party polarization, as well as 
significant intra-party divergence. While state parties feel the influence of national 
political trends, it appears they maintain significant independence from national parties, 
and each other (Paddock 1991; 2005). 
Platforms serve several purposes and are written for both internal and external 
audiences, which often lead to considerable complexity (Harmel et al. 1995). Party 
platforms, at any level, serve as an important branding tool, allowing parties the 
opportunity to influence how they are perceived by the public. Whereas political 
campaigns are beleaguered often by media involvement, platforms provide an avenue 
of largely unmediated communication. Platforms allow parties to project an image to 
the public, but also to politicians, activists, and scholars. Just as retailers and car 
manufacturers craft images through their marketing, parties can do so through 
platforms. Consider the advertising campaigns for luxury cars so prevalent during the 
holiday season. These feature an expensive car being given as a gift, in front of an 
impressive home, with beautiful people in designer clothes. Millions are exposed to 
these ad campaigns – but their purpose is more to build upon the car company’s 
reputation than to convince individuals to purchase their product. Parties have the 
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 Given the daunting data collection limitations, Paddock’s studies focus on selected subsets of state party 
platforms and analyze only some states in some years. For details of the data used, see Paddock (2005). 
Paddock’s studies used a coding scheme modified from Ginsberg (1972; 1976). 
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opportunity to act similarly by creating a document that reflects how they want to be 
perceived.  
In a nation with few viable political parties, Democrats and Republicans must 
manage big-tent coalitions. Invariably, the need to appeal to (and avoid alienating) 
various groups with inconsistent views necessitates compromise and careful control of 
messages. A well-designed platform can signal to interest groups that the party is 
committed to a shared ambition and shore up political and financial support, even when 
parties are unwilling to adopt strong planks groups often prefer.7 Content and phrasing 
help interest group determine if they will have access to officials, if elected (Morehouse 
1981). 
Interest groups can look to party platforms to identify which issues the parties 
perceive as most important, with the assumption that issues not addressed are seen as 
less critical. Consider, for example, that more than 17 percent of the Connecticut 
Republican platform is focused on free market principles, deregulation, and individual 
enterprise, while the average for all Republican state platforms is only 6.5 percent. With 
nearly one-fifth of the platform focused on this narrow set of issues, their salience to 
the Connecticut Republicans is unambiguous.  
In addition, groups can use party platforms to gauge a party’s position on a 
particular issue and determine how moderate or extreme a party’s preferences are. For 
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 Interest groups may play a passive role by simply listening to state parties’ positions, but they may also 
take an active role in the development of state party platforms by meeting with platforms drafters to 
discuss concerns or offering platform writers language they would like to see. For example, during the 
drafting of the Arkansas Democrats’ 2006 platform the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
League (NARAL) offered language regarding abortion they wanted to see, but the final draft included only 
a simple statement supporting privacy rights. 
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example, Illinois Republicans chose to include a strong pro-life statement in their 
platform:  
Recognizing that the rights and needs of children begin at 
conception, the Republican Party of Illinois embraces the Right to Life of 
innocent unborn children and supports reform proposals protecting that 
right and limiting the practice of abortion in Illinois. We believe… the 
unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life, which cannot be 
infringed. The Party affirms its support for a human life amendment… to 
the U.S. Constitution and we endorse making clear that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection applies to unborn children…. We urge the 
reversal of Roe v. Wade.8 
In contrast, Texas Democrats chose to use a more measured tone in their 
support of reproductive rights. While indicating a pro-choice stance, the tone reflects 
acknowledgement of conservative voices of many Texas Democrats:  
Texas Democrats trust the women of Texas to make personal and 
responsible decisions about when and whether to bear children, in 
consultation with their family, their physician, personal conscience or 
their God… (We) support prevention measures which have proven 
effective at reducing unintended pregnancies, and which would reduce 
the rate of abortion.9 
Similarly, West Virginia Democrats opted for a pro-choice stance that focuses on 
the issue of personal liberty and small government, without an overt or lengthy 
discussion of abortion: “West Virginia Democrats believe that government… should not 
interfere with an individual’s or family’s right to make a personal or medical decision.”10 
These examples highlight how state party platforms are crafted to appease party 
factions when conservative members of Democratic state parties are reluctant to 
support liberal national platform planks, or the reverse in state Republican parties. 
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 2008 Illinois Republican Platform. 
9
 2010 Texas Democratic Platform. 
10
 2008 West Virginia Party Platform. 
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Platforms may, in fact, be crafted to signal policy positions to groups without 
unnecessarily inflaming passions. 
The Development of State Party Platforms  
Platforms, crafted by activists and public officials, allow political elites to clarify 
and explicate shared values and policy preferences. This could help parties develop 
some level of internal consistency and coherence, as well as foster unity among those 
running for office. State political parties use a variety of methods to develop state 
platforms, with varying patterns of centralization in the process and different degrees of 
elite control. In the Arkansas Democratic Party, a platform committee is appointed by 
the state party’s executive director with input from committee members and political 
candidates to ensure adequate diversity. The platform committee consists of 
approximately 15-20 members and represents a variety of interests within the Arkansas 
Democratic Party including variation in sex, race, geography, and ideology, and includes 
individuals representing key factions of the party including agricultural interests, 
teachers, the gubernatorial candidate’s campaign, and proponents of equal rights for 
racial and ethnic groups, women, and other social minorities.  
Like many other state parties, Arkansas Democrats begin their bi-annual drafting 
process with a preference for the status quo. They begin with the previous platform as 
the first draft and make changes as necessary, taking into consideration the political 
positions of key Democratic candidates, as well as the political climate of the state. The 
platform committee breaks into smaller subcommittees to address various sections of 
the platform, debate changes, and consider input from interested groups. After 
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subcommittees develop a draft, the full committee meets again to iron out any 
disagreements. Shortly before the state party convention, the committee releases the 
draft platform. Immediately prior to the convention a public hearing is held to elicit 
feedback from party delegates. A final round of changes is made after the public hearing 
and the final draft is presented to delegates at the convention and offered for approval.  
The Arkansas Democrats use a process comparable to many other state parties; 
Maine Republicans use a similar system, and Missouri Democrats’ newly adopted 
procedures establish a comparable process. However, not all state parties rely on a 
process as centralized as this. In Colorado, local committees participate in selecting 
members of the platform committee, and these delegates serve alongside elected 
Democratic officials on the state platform committee. The committee is responsible for 
drafting a platform and presenting it at the state party convention where only planks 
receiving support of two-thirds of delegates at the state convention are included in the 
final platform.  
Some state parties use an even more decentralized process. The Texas 
Republican Party emphasizes participation at the precinct and county levels where the 
committees consider policy positions directly. Approved policy positions are sent up a 
level, and finally are considered at the state party convention where positions are voted 
on by all present delegates. 
Within each of these methods are internal debates and struggles for the party’s 
attention. State party platforms cannot address every issue in full, and agreement on 
party positions is impossible at times. The big-tent nature of American parties, even at 
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the state level, demands that they balance the needs of factions and these demands 
shape final platforms. 
Patterns in State Party Platforms  
When parties struggle to incorporate the preferences of diverse interests, 
intriguing compromises are made and state party platforms include interesting patterns 
of variation that underscore their divergence from the national platforms. State party 
platforms may change significantly over time and frequently include planks that are a 
reflection of the specific time when they were written. For example, in 2010 several 
state party platforms called for action in response to the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC. This highlights an issue tied to a current and time-
sensitive political debate.11 Other platform planks are of limited interest, not because of 
time sensitivity, but because of the limitations of geographical interest. The need to 
eradicate an agricultural pest present in the southwest, or control the populations of 
invasive species in the Great Lakes may not inspire national concern or have sufficient 
support to make it into the national platforms. These issues may, however, be of critical 
interest to state leaders, activists, and voters, and it makes good political sense for state 
parties to address such local concerns. For example: 
The Asian carp must be kept out of the Great Lakes… Fighting 
these invasive species has proven to be a significant economic drain — 
every year, the Great Lakes region spends $30 million to keep water pipes 
from becoming clogged with zebra mussels.12  
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 “We call for… legislation remedying the deleterious effects of Citizens United v. FEC” (2010 Washington 
Democrats).  
12
 2010 Michigan Democratic Party platform. 
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Here, we have an example of an issue with significant state and regional 
significance – invasive species in the Great Lakes, but of little national concern.13 
Although the economic impacts of invasive species in the Great Lakes may eventually be 
felt outside of the region, it lacks the national interest to merit attention in a national 
party platform. 
Other times, some of the planks found in state party platforms reflect policy 
positions on seemingly bizarre topics. Consider, for example, the Washington State 
Republican platform from 1992. This platform included a plank opposing the teaching of 
“New Age Movement Philosophy, including reincarnation, mystical powers, and Satan 
worship” in public schools (Wilcox and Robinson 2011, 108). This plank was considered 
important enough to be included in the final draft of the Washington State Republican 
platform, but it is unlikely that the teaching of Satan worship was ever really a 
significant problem in public schools.  
Conclusion 
State party platforms provide state parties with an opportunity to express party 
values and articulate policy preferences without sound bite editing – a rare opportunity 
for unmediated party communication with interest groups, activists, and the public. The 
process of revision and compromise within the state parties provides a fascinating 
window into the parties’ policy preferences and political priorities, and a wonderful 
opportunity to assess the independence of state parties. Now that the purpose and 
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 The Asian carp has a peculiar habit of leaping into the air when the water is disturbed and can be 
dangerous to unprotected boaters and decimate native species populations. 
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development of state party platforms is clear, the next chapter will discuss the 
platforms utilized in this study and will provide a detailed description of the coding 
scheme used to assess platform content. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA & METHODS 
All of the political parties have two faces – a public face turned 
towards the media, the voters, and the rest of the world, and an inward-
looking face reserved for the initiated, activists, elected representatives 
and leaders, who have access to their secret garden.14   
Platform Inventory 
The primary data I analyze are from the platforms written by the Democratic and 
Republican state parties in 2008 and 2010. Most platforms were collected from state 
party websites between August 2010 and August 2011, while a few others were 
obtained from direct email communication with state party officials and later website 
searches. For comparison purposes, the national platforms for the Democratic and 
Republican parties are included as well.  
Not all state parties choose to develop unique platforms each election season. A 
few state parties prefer to adopt a set of more general principles that are maintained on 
a semi-permanent basis. In this sample, five state parties selected this route.15 State 
parties that opt to draft their platforms as sets of semi-permanent principles generally 
do so very concisely. These five state party platforms are among the shortest in the 
current sample, with fewer than 800 words in each and three under 300 words. 
In addition, a few other state parties prefer to simply adopt the national party 
platform as their own. In this sample, four state parties embraced a national platform 
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 Charlot 1989, 361. 
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 State parties with semi-permanent platforms: Alabama Democrats, Alabama Republicans, Connecticut 
Republicans, Maryland Republicans, and Oklahoma Democrats. 
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and are not included in the subsequent analysis.16 Other state political parties decline 
any involvement with party platforms. They do not develop their own platform, adopt a 
set of enduring principles, or formally adopt the national party’s platform. It appears 
that 16 state political parties choose this route. In total, the dataset contains 80 unique 
state party platforms from the 2008-2010 election seasons and two national party 
platforms. Table 1 provides an overview of the platforms included in this analysis. 
State Democratic 
Platform Year 
Republican 
Platform Year 
State Democratic 
Platform Year 
Republican 
Platform Year 
National 2008 2008 Montana 2010 2010 
Alabama Permanent Permanent Nebraska 2010 2008 
Alaska 2010 2010 Nevada 2010 2010 
Arizona 2010 2010 New Hampshire 2010 2010 
Arkansas 2010 2010 New Jersey None None 
California 2010 2008 New Mexico 2010 2010 
Colorado 2010 2010 New York None None 
Connecticut 2010 Permanent North Carolina 2008 2010 
Delaware 2010 National North Dakota None 2010 
Florida None 2010 Ohio National None 
Georgia 2010 2010 Oklahoma Permanent 2010 
Hawaii 2010 2010 Oregon 2010 2010 
Idaho 2010 2010 Pennsylvania None 2010 
Illinois None 2008 Rhode Island None National 
Indiana 2008 2010 South Carolina 2010 2010 
Iowa 2010 2010 South Dakota 2010 2010 
Kansas 2010 2010 Tennessee None None 
Kentucky None National Texas 2010 2010 
Louisiana None 2008 Utah 2010 2010 
Maine 2010 2010 Vermont 2010 2010 
Maryland None Permanent Virginia 2010 2010 
Massachusetts 2010 2010 Washington 2010 2010 
Michigan 2010 2010 West Virginia 2008 2008 
Minnesota 2008 2010 Wisconsin 2010 2010 
Mississippi 2010 2008 Wyoming 2010 2010 
Missouri None 2008    
Table 1: State Party Platform Inventory 
Coding Scheme 
I use a coding scheme adapted from the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(Volkens, et al 2011). The CMP is a large-scale effort to collect and analyze the party 
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 State parties that formally adopted the national party platform as their own: Delaware Republicans, 
Kentucky Republicans, Ohio Democrats, and Rhode Island Republicans. 
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manifestos of countries around the world. Although the CMP began in 1979 as a 
relatively small project, it has ballooned and now regularly analyzes more than 3,000 
party manifestos from over 50 countries (Werner and Lacewell 2011). Because of the 
CMP’s extensive data collection, patterns can be traced over time and the cross national 
dataset ensures that conclusions are not drawn from the peculiarities of a single nation. 
CMP data allow researchers to conduct empirical tests of formal and spatial theories, 
providing better insight into party behavior. To assess the strategic behavior of parties, 
Rovney (2012) examined parties’ tendencies to express ambiguous policy positions. 
Ambiguous position taking is often seen as electorally advantageous because vague 
policy positions are less likely to offend potential supporters. The more specific a party’s 
policy preferences, the more likely voters will find reason to object. Rovney (2012) 
found that where a party’s positions are further from the center, or more extreme, the 
party tendss to emphasize these issues and take clear, unambiguous stances. 
Alternatively on issue dimensions where a party’s position is near the center, the party 
is more likely to propose ambiguous policy preferences, de-emphasizing these issues, 
and allowing them to appeal to a wider segment of the electorate. Contrary to spatial 
theory, Rovney’s (2012) findings suggest that parties often compete by blurring their 
positions, rather than overt position taking. 
We can use CMP data to assess how parties react to their competitors’ behavior 
to understand better how the interaction of parties influences politics. Andrews and 
Money (2009) found that as the number of parties competing in a political system 
increases, the breadth of the ideological spectrum occupied by parties does as well. 
27 
Perhaps most interesting about Andrew’s and Money’s findings is that there appears to 
be a natural limit to this pattern; as party systems expand beyond five parties, new 
parties have difficulty finding a unique ideological space. Moreover, contrary to 
expectations, a system’s electoral rules only influence the number of parties,  not their 
ideological location or relative spacing (Andrews and Money 2009). Using CMP data, 
Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) examined how parties in a political system react to 
ideological movements of other parties. They found that when a party makes a 
significant ideological shift, its rivals will follow, and this reactive behavior is amplified 
when the rival parties are ideologically close. It appears that parties react to public 
opinion as well as the behavior of their opponents. Adams, et al (2004) found that a 
shift in public opinion away from a party’s ideological position spurs a reactive shift by 
the parties. Although clear public opinion shifts prompt changes to party platforms, past 
election results do not appear to have the same effect. 
Researchers employing CMP data frequently come to very interesting 
conclusions and uncover patterns previously hidden. Fineraas (2010) used CMP data to 
uncover ties between the social and economic policy dimensions.  Fineraas (2010) found 
that when there is more party polarization on social issues, the political response to 
income inequality will be feebler. In political systems with higher levels of polarization 
on social issues, low income voters are less likely to coalesce around a single party. 
When low income voters are fragmented, their political power is diminished and 
government has less incentive to act on income inequality. The clear, tangible link 
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between social extremism and economic policy can make the impact of morality politics 
seem that much more important. 
CMP research can also be used to understand current political trends. As we 
watch the European Union struggle with integration in difficult economic times, 
understanding the impact of integration for domestic politics is vitally important. Steiner 
and Martin (2012) put CMP data to work and found that as European economic 
integration increases, the economic positions taken by parties across the continent are 
more homogenous. This reduced variation in economic policy alternatives has had a 
dampening effect on electoral turnout.  
Researchers have found numerous ways to use CMP data to examine a wide 
array of political behaviors and policy changes. Kittilson (2010) used CMP data to 
analyze the impact of increased gender diversity in legislatures,17 and CMP data allowed 
Kim (2007) to examine the relationship between public confidence in parties and 
political institutions. Although researchers have used CMP data to test divergent 
theories in vastly different specialties, most research focuses on broad patterns at the 
national level, rather than more nuanced, sub-national patterns. 
CMP data provides researchers with the ability to examine patterns through time 
and across many nations, as well as trace specific trends in single nations.18 The CPM 
coding scheme is well documented in existing comparative research but is relatively 
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 Increases of women holding legislative office leads to increasing focus on social justice in party 
platforms.  
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 For example, Jansen, Graaff, and Need (2011) used CMP to examine voting patterns in the Netherlands 
and Cochrane (2010) reassessed the role of ideology in the traditional “brokerage” model of Canadian 
politics. 
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unused in the American context. Existing research focuses exclusively on national party 
platforms; for example, Simas and Evans (2011) used CMP and American National 
Election Study (ANES) data to examine how voters are able to use national party 
platforms to assess presidential candidates; the more liberal the national party 
platform, the more liberal the presidential nominee is perceived. Budge and Hofferbert 
(1990) found that the platforms drafted by the national Democratic and Republican 
parties accurately indicate which ideological direction policy will move if either party is 
put into power. While Congress and the president are often able to thwart the policy 
ambitions of one another, but it appears that controlling the White House better 
positions parties to direct shifts in federal spending. Interestingly, Budge and Hofferbert 
(1990) found that the degree control over the shift in federal spending varied by policy 
area, suggesting that even when out of power, the parties retained some influence over 
certain policy areas. For example, even when out of power, planks from the Democratic 
Party platform regarding education are more likely to be implemented than planks from 
the national Republican platform. This project will apply the same rigorous analysis used 
for national party manifestos to US state party platforms. 
Unit of Analysis 
Consistent with previous work done by the Comparative Manifesto Project, the 
coding unit is a “quasi-sentence” or clause.  A quasi-sentence is a clause no longer than 
a sentence that addresses only one policy argument. A sentence is often coded as a 
single unit, but long, complex sentences and lists are broken into several quasi-
sentences when multiple policy arguments are included. This technique is the preferred 
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method for analyzing other political communications as well, including campaign 
advertisements and political speeches (Benoit 1999). Some political communication 
research relies on larger coding units of sentences or paragraphs, but this masks the 
variety of issues addressed and may lead to significantly biased results. The more 
precise quasi-sentence coding unit employed here allows for a more nuanced evaluation 
of state party platform content.  
Computer coding programs have become increasingly popular in recent years, 
allowing for a single researcher to sift through enormous amounts of text quickly and 
with impressive reliability. However, with the use of computer programs, often context 
and an understanding of whether a particular word or phrase is positive or negative, 
liberal or conservative is lost. Most programs rely on simple word counts where the 
presence of specific words is used to measure content and the validity of the 
conclusions rest heavily on the quality of the coding dictionary. While this may be 
sufficient for some purposes, such methods fail to distinguish between policy positions 
or take into account the strength of policy statements. The incidence of the word 
“abortion” may be used as evidence of the topic’s prevalence in the document, but 
more precise measures are needed to distinguish between pro-life and pro-choice policy 
positions, as well as rigid versus moderate stances. This loss of validity severely limits 
the value of computer content analysis for this project. Due to these lingering 
limitations in commonly available coding programs, I employ traditional human coding. 
One of the primary drawbacks to manual content analysis is that it is extraordinarily 
time consuming. Coding required me to read each state party platform and break the 
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content into discrete quasi-sentences. Then, I reviewed each platform a second time to 
assess the content of each quasi-sentence. Only then was I able to begin to build a 
usable dataset. 
Too often, human content analysis research suffers from what is known as the 
“one manifesto – one coder” problem, which can raise significant reliability concerns 
(Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012). To guard against reliability issues, I underwent 
extensive training under the supervision of a CMP training advisor who introduced the 
CMP coding scheme and supervised my progress through the formal CMP training 
procedures. Once I completed the final training test I began to code the state party 
platforms used in this study. In addition to the training I received from the CMP staff, I 
also checked my coding against the coding results of two additional CMP-trained coders. 
This redundancy helps to ensure maximum reliability in the coding results. The average 
intercoder reliability for state party platform ideology measures is .88 and .96 for the 
CMP and Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) methods, respectively. I coded all state party 
platforms between March 2011 and September 2011. 
Coding Categories 
I measure state parties’ policy preferences using seven basic policy domain 
categories, with several subcategories within each to identify both the policy area 
mentioned in the quasi-sentence, as well as the direction of the policy preference. Once 
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platforms are broken into a series of quasi-sentences, one of 56 policy codes from eight 
distinct policy domains was assigned (Table 2).19  
Table 2: CMP Coding Categories 
External Relations  
In the policy domain of “external relations,” eight subcoding categories exist. 
Quasi-sentences addressing issues of external security, national defense, international 
cooperation, and international negotiation are considered external relations and receive 
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 See Appendix A for coding procedures and Appendix B for a full description of the modified CMP coding 
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 DOMAIN 1: External Relations 411 Technology and Infrastructure 
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 412 Controlled Economy 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 413 Nationalisation 
103 Anti-Imperialism 414 Economic Orthodoxy 
104 Military: Positive 415 Marxist Analysis  
105 Military: Negative 416 Sustainability 
106 Peace   
107 Internationalism: Positive  DOMAIN 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
109 Internationalism: Negative 501 Environmental Protection 
  502 Culture 
 DOMAIN 2: Freedom and Democracy 503 Equality 
200 Libertarianism 504 Welfare State: Positive 
201 Freedom and Human Rights 505 Welfare State: Negative 
202 Democracy 506 Education Expansion 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive 507 Education Limitation 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative 508 The Myth of Global Warming 
    
 DOMAIN 3: Political System  DOMAIN 6: Fabric of Society 
301 Federalism/States’ Rights 601 National Way of life: Positive 
302 Centralisation 602 National Way of life: Negative 
303 Governmental & Administrative Efficiency 603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
304 Political Corruption 604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
305 Political Authority 605 Law and Order 
  606 Civic Mindedness 
 DOMAIN 4: Economy 607 Multiculturalism: Positive  
401 Free Market Economy 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
402 Incentives   
403 Market Regulation  DOMAIN 7: Social Groups 
404 Economic Planning 701 Labour Groups: Positive  
405 Corporatism/ Mixed Economy 702 Labour Groups: Negative 
406 Protectionism: Positive 703 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive 
407 Protectionism: Negative 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups 
408 Economic Goals 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups 
409 Keynesian Demand Management 706 Non-economic Demographic Groups 
410 Economic Growth   
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a code between 101 and 109. Mentions of relations between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, Mexico, or Canada receive codes 101 or 102, depending on whether 
the relationship was mentioned favorably or negatively. Only two state parties 
mentioned US relations with those nations with whom we have a special relationship – 
Michigan Democrats and Texas Republicans and all seven policy mentions were positive. 
Examples of positive foreign special relationships include, “We are committed to a 
continuing strong relationship with Michigan’s largest trading partner, Canada”20 and 
“We support policies, which strengthen Mexican democratic institutions, including 
continued legal reform to address the issue of corruption.”21 
The 80 platforms analyzed in this study contained 340 positive mentions of the 
US military, a third of which came from only five Republican state party platforms.22 
Positive military references can take many forms, although mentions of terrorism and 
vague statements in support of our troops are most common: 
 The Missouri Republican Party supports…. all efforts to root out the agents of 
terror and protect Americans from the evils of terrorism.23 
 We support actions taken against those who would seek to do us harm… and 
we support the men and women of the Connecticut National Guard and our 
Armed Forces who serve our nation with bravery and distinction.24 
Sixty percent of the negative military mentions came from just four Democratic 
state party platforms.25 As with the positive military category, negative military 
mentions took on a variety of forms. In some instances, state parties called for the 
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 2010 Michigan Democratic state party platform. 
21
 2010 Texas Republican state party platform. 
22
 Texas (41), Oklahoma (21), Arkansas (17), Missouri (16), and South Carolina (15). 
23
 2008 Missouri Republican state party platform. 
24
 2010 Connecticut Democratic state party platform. 
25
 Washington (22), Colorado (14), Wisconsin (13), and California (10). 
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ending of current military engagements, “We call for the closing of all U.S. bases in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the end of funding for the U.S. occupation of those countries....”26 In 
other cases, state parties proposed reductions in military spending, “Our military budget 
should be reduced with greater emphasis placed on economic development and 
diplomacy to achieve global security and curtail the undue influence of the ‘Military 
Industrial Complex.’”27 
Policy mentions related to international cooperation and unilateralism versus 
multilateral action receive codes of 107 or 109. Policy statements supportive of 
international cooperation, global aid, support for multinational organizations, etc. are 
positive internationalism statements (code 107). Again, just under a third of the 233 
positive internationalism statements are found in just a few Democratic platforms.28 
Positive mentions of international cooperation often focus on how nations can work 
together to solve international problems, “International initiatives to reduce pollution, 
manage water supplies, reduce  dependence on non-renewable energy, and promote 
voluntary family planning.”29 
Opposition to internationalism is coded as 109. While less common, these 
negative mentions of international cooperation show up 111 times, concentrated 
heavily in the Republican platforms from Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Texas 
Republicans make a strong statement against internationalism: “We urge Congress to 
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 2010 Colorado Democratic state party platform. 
27
 2010 Wisconsin Democratic state party platform. 
28
 Washington (30), Iowa (27), Colorado (24), and California (20). 
29
 2010 Iowa Democratic state party platform. 
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evict the United Nations from the United States and eliminate any further 
participation.”30  
Freedom and Democracy 
The domain of “freedom and democracy” contains five subcategories for quasi-
sentences addressing freedom, democracy, civil rights, and constitutionalism. Codes 
between 200 and 204 are assigned to these issues, and statements related to the 
structure of government fall into this policy domain, “We must restore the balance of 
power among the… branches of our Federal government and completely restore 
Constitutional rights.”31 Policy references to voting laws fit squarely into the democracy 
category, “Vermont Republicans believe that we must maintain the integrity of our 
voting system for legal citizens of Vermont by having a requirement that every voter 
produce positive identification to register and to vote.”32 
Specific mentions of the US and state constitutions also fall into the freedom and 
democracy policy domain. Policy statements supporting the status quo of constitutions 
belong in category 203 and include mentions of support for specific aspects of 
constitutional documents, “The South Carolina Republican Party supports the 200+ year-
old Constitutional right of the people to keep and bear arms.”33  Opposition to current 
constitutions or calls for constitutional amendments are coded as 204, “We support…. A 
constitutional amendment setting term limits for the U.S. Congress.”34 
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 2010 Texas Republican Party Platform. 
31
 Code 200; 2010 Washington Democratic Party Platform. 
32
 2010 Vermont Republican Party Platform.  
33
 2010 South Carolina Party Platform. 
34
 2010 Oklahoma Republican state party platform. 
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Political Systems 
The “political systems” domain covers policies related to federalism, 
governmental efficiency and political authority, and such references receive codes of 
301 to 305. Often, state parties argue for increased state-level discretion and for a 
general federal hands-off approach to governance. California Republicans write “We 
believe the state, not the federal government, should govern and dictate criminal 
statutes,”35 and Nebraska Democrats “oppose efforts to take away the right of the 
people to determine education policy through their elected state and local boards of 
education.”36 These statements focus on traditional limits of federalism and emphasize 
state rights, and receive a code of 301. Concerns about governmental corruption also 
fall into the political systems policy domain. For example, “(We) demand the criminal 
prosecution of any State employee who lies or purposefully misrepresents facts at 
public meetings,”37 and “We expect the swift impeachment and removal from office of 
officials who commit high crimes and misdemeanors.”38 
Economic Policy 
The economic policy domain contains a broad range of economic issues. Codes 
between 410 and 416 are assigned to policy statements related to the free market, 
economic growth, and trade protectionism. A code of 401 is given to any policy 
statements in support of the free market ideal, deregulation, and protection of private 
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 2008 California Republican Party Platform. 
36
 2010 Nebraska Democratic Party Platform. 
37
 2010 Wyoming Republican Party Platform. 
38
 2010 Wisconsin Democratic Party Platform. 
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property. Support for these policies is common in state party platforms, showing up 
nearly 500 times. Examples include: 
 We believe free, fair and competitive markets are best for both the producer 
and the consumer.39  
 We will defend… private property from unnecessary government 
infringement, including state laws or regulations which erode property rights 
and inhibit the free use, the right to privacy, and the enjoyment of private 
property.40 
 We believe that prosperity results from freedom, and that the 
unencumbered free market is the most efficient method of allocating 
resources and setting fair prices and wages with a minimum of government 
interference and regulations.41 
While support for free market principles is a popular topic in state party 
platforms, so are calls for government economic regulation, consumer protection, and 
the protection of small businesses from large corporations (403). Economic regulation 
can take many forms, as do calls for government action: 
 We support requiring all lenders to meet acceptable standards for protecting 
reverse mortgage customers, mandating independent pre-loan counseling 
for all reverse mortgage applicants,  and limiting lending fees.42 
 We support enforcing anti-trust, regulatory legislation…. (and) establishing 
fair limits on bank fees, penalties.43 
The 2008-2010 recession had a clear impact on the development of state party 
platform and demands for limiting spending, balancing budgets, reducing the deficit 
were common themes in both Democratic and Republican state party platforms (414): 
 Utah Democrats have a firm and enduring belief in low taxes and balanced 
budgets.44  
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 2010 South Dakota Republican Party Platform. 
40
 2010 Montana Republican Party Platform. 
41
 2010 Montana Republican Party Platform. 
42
 2010 Michigan Democratic Party Platform. 
43
 2010 Iowa Democratic Party Platform. 
44
 2010 Utah Democratic Party Platform. 
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 We Democrats vow to put state government on a diet and balance our state 
budgets without raising taxes.45 
 The Party calls on every level of government to return to sound fiscal 
management that provides effective and efficient government with a 
minimum amount of taxation. 46 
The economic policy domain also includes references to public infrastructure, 
including support for highways, rail lines, and airport service (411):  
 We support designating the transportation funds for maintenance, repair, 
support and usage of Vermont’s highway, rail, aviation, and road 
infrastructure.47 
 Montana Republicans believe Montana deserves legitimate, reasonable and 
efficient rail service. 48 
Along with mentions of transportation infrastructure, the subcategory of 411 
includes references in support of technological infrastructure and vocational and 
technological training:  
 We support creating a public‐private partnership to expand and enhance a 
statewide high speed Internet infrastructure that is both affordable and 
accessible to all.49 
 We support efforts to build and retain a qualified workforce through 
increased training opportunities… (and) a commitment to career and 
technical education.50 
Welfare and Quality of Life 
Quasi-sentences coded between 501 and 508 are part of the “welfare and 
quality of life” domain. This category contains a wide variety of policies related to 
environmental protection, the welfare state, social justice, and education. Policy 
statements supporting environmental protection, addressing climate change, reducing 
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 2010 South Dakota Democratic Party Platform. 
46
 2010 South Carolina Republican Party Platform. 
47
 2010 Vermont Republican Party Platform. 
48
 2010 Montana Republican Party Platform. 
49
 2010 Montana Democratic Party Platform. 
50
 2010 Virginia Democratic Party Platform. 
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pollution, and the protection of wildlife fall into category 501. Environmental protection 
is a common theme in state party platforms, showing up more than 1,300 times. Some 
statements in support of environmental protection are vague and express a broad 
desire to be green, “We should encourage recycling to reduce waste, conservation of 
energy including the use of renewable energy sources, and choosing products which are 
not harmful to plants and wildlife.”51 In other cases, pro-environment policy preferences 
are more specific and aggressive, “We support mandatory local and regional recycling of 
paper, glass, metals, plastics and other reusable materials in order to reduce the need 
for landfills.”52 
Discussions of the American welfare state belong in the welfare and quality of 
life policy domain – including mentions of social security, Medicaid, Medicare, and low-
income housing. Policy statements supporting government provision of this social safety 
net are coded as 504, while statements in opposition to a social safety net, statements 
proposing government cuts to social welfare programs, and calls for the privatization of 
welfare programs are coded as 505. 
 (We) strongly oppose detrimental budget cuts in Medicare/Medicaid.53 
 We support the recently enacted healthcare reform legislation as a first step 
in the process toward a quality universal single-payer health care system, 
independent of employment.54 
 We support privatization of the Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid 
programs.55 
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 2010 Arkansas Republican Party Platform. 
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 2008 North Carolina Democratic Party Platform. 
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 2010 California Democratic Party Platform. 
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 2010 Colorado Democratic Party Platform. 
55
 2010 Oklahoma Republican Party Platform. 
40 
As with issues related to the welfare state, discussions of education are 
separated into two categories. Calls for the expansion of public education to the 
improvement of public education (including increased public education funding) belong 
in category 506. 
 We support low student-teacher ratios to enhance the quality of educational 
instruction.56  
 We recognize the importance of Idaho's higher education system in 
continuing the education of our citizens.57 
Statements opposing the public school system, calls for reduced public school 
funding, preferences for private schools, and support for public funding to private and 
parochial schools are coded as 507. 
 We urge the Legislature to abolish property taxes for the purpose of funding 
schools and to shift the tax burden to a consumption-based tax while 
maintaining or reducing the overall tax burden.58 
 We encourage the Governor and the Texas Legislature to enact child-
centered school funding options – which fund the student, not schools or 
districts – to allow maximum freedom of choice in public, private or parochial 
education for all.”59 
 We are firmly against the establishment of universal pre-school programs in 
Minnesota.60 
Fabric of Society 
The policy domain containing codes 601 through 608 addresses the “fabric of 
society” and patriotism, religion, morality policies, and multiculturalism fall into this 
policy domain. Claims of patriotism and favorable mentions of founding ideas receive a 
code of 601, “The Party supports the preservation of our Republic, its ideals and 
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 2010 Nevada Democratic Party Platform. 
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 2010 Idaho Republican Party Platform. 
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 2010 Texas Republican Party Platform. 
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 2010 Texas Republican Party Platform. 
60
 2010 Minnesota Republican Party Platform. 
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institutions for the good of all Americans and adamantly opposes the erosion of these 
cherished freedoms.”61  
The fabric of society policy domain also includes all references to morality and 
religious policies. Mentions to policies related to abortion, gambling, homosexuality, 
religion, and sexual education all fall into this policy domain. Policy statements 
supporting traditional moral or religious positions are coded as 603, and include 
statements opposing the liberalization of sexual mores, opposition to contraception, 
disapproval of gambling, hostility towards homosexuality, condemnation of evolutionary 
teachings, and denunciation of abortion. 
 The North Dakota Republican Party supports teaching about the true risks 
regarding pre-marital sexual activity for both men and women.62  
 We oppose sale and use of the dangerous “Morning After Pill”.63 
 We oppose holding out the myth of “safe sex” to our teens as it is morally 
debasing and medically questionable.64 
 We believe that gambling devastates the individual, the family and the 
community and therefore oppose any further gambling expansion in our 
state.65 
 We believe that the scientific evidence supporting Intelligent Design and 
biblical creation should be included in the Oklahoma public school curricula, 
and where any evolution theory is taught, both should receive equal funding, 
time, and material.66 
 We support a return to the policy of the United States military to exclude 
homosexuals as a matter of good order, morale, and discipline.67 
Policy statements in opposition to traditional morality, or in support of a more 
liberal view of morality, are coded as 604. Support for access to abortion service, 
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 2010 North Dakota Republican Party Platform. 
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 2008 Nebraska Republican Party Platform. 
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 2010 Oklahoma Republican Party Platform. 
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 2008 Nebraska Republican Party Platform. 
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favorable references to stem-cell research, opposition to discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, support for comprehensive sexual education, and defense of full 
contraception access fall into this category: 
 We support a democratic government that…extends to gay and lesbian 
couples and their families all the same legal and social rights and protections 
that heterosexual couples now receive, including civil marriage.68 
 We believe that a woman's decisions regarding pregnancy should be her own 
choice and not that of the government.69 
 The South Carolina Democratic Party calls upon the U.S. Federal Government 
to permit and generously fund stem cell research.70 
Policy references to internal security and law enforcement are included in this 
policy domain as well, and statements regarding the judicial system and prison policies 
are common across party platforms. While calls for increased enforcement of laws and 
the tightening of legal loopholes dominates the law and order discussion, some state 
party platforms also include references to easing punishments or focusing on 
prevention, rather than punishment: 
 (We) believe repeat sexual offenders, particularly those whose victims were 
children, should be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.71  
 We support tougher prison sentences for identity theft, auto theft, burglary 
and forgery.72  
 Supports the adoption of a no retreat law.73 
 Reduce prison overcrowding and the drain on our economy by decreasing 
penalties for minor drug offenses and other victimless crimes, making the 
punishment fit the crime.74 
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Social Groups 
Finally, codes 701 through 706 are reserved for policies related to social groups, 
including organized labor, farmers, the disabled, and the elderly. Policy statements 
supporting the rights of workers to organize, calls for improved treatments of workers, 
and positive references to pensions are coded as 701. For example, “We support the 
extension of bargaining rights with binding arbitration to all employees, public and 
private.”75 Statements opposing collective bargaining rights, opposition to pension 
plans, and support for right to work legislation are coded as 702 and include policy 
statements like, “We oppose collective bargaining for public employees in order that 
essential services are not interrupted”76 and “The Arizona Republican Party… supports 
state and national Right to Work legislation.”77 References to farmers and agriculture 
policy receive a code of 703, “We support those actions that would ensure the safety 
and protection of Montana's agriculture from predators, rodents, and wolves.”78 
Unfortunately, not all quasi-sentences fit neatly into the 56 category coding 
scheme. The reliability of the data analysis depends heavily upon the accuracy of the 
coding and it is essential that the platforms have low numbers of uncoded quasi-
sentences, especially in the shortest platforms (Budge, et al 2001; Kligemann, et al 
2006). Fortunately, in this sample only about 2 percent of quasi-sentences received a 
code of “000” indicating that either the quasi-sentence addressed a policy area not 
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 2010 Idaho Democratic Party Platform. 
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 2008 West Virginia Republican Party Platform. 
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 2010 Arizona Republican Party Platform. 
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 2010 Montana Republican Party Platform.  
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covered by the coding scheme, or that the quasi-sentence did not contain any relevant 
policy.  
 Overview of Party Platform Issue Content 
Platform length and ideology can tell us a great deal about party platforms, but 
neither can replace an analysis of actual issue content. While chapters 5 and 6 will 
address issue content in more detail, I would like to provide a brief overview of platform 
content for the national and state party platforms used in this analysis. Figure 1 displays 
the average proportion of coding units dedicated to each policy domain for Democratic 
and Republican party platforms, at the state and national levels. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of State and National Party Platforms Dedicated to Policy Domains, by Party, 2008-2010 
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External Relations  
Approximately a quarter of the national Democratic Party platform is dedicated 
to issues of external relations, including issues of war and diplomacy (Figure 1). 
Although the national Republican Party platform dedicated a slightly smaller proportion 
of its platform to external relations, nearly of fifth of the platform addressed these 
issues. On average, state party platforms dedicated just 5 percent of coding units to 
issues of external relations. While a lesser focus on external relations is expected at the 
state level, it is interesting to note that the proportional focus was identical for 
Democratic and Republican state party platforms. 
Looking deeper, although Democratic and Republican state party platforms 
dedicated the same proportion of their platforms to external relations, their focus was 
different (Figure 2). Nearly 40 percent of Democratic state party platform mentions of 
external relations were positive mentions of internationalism (107), while Republican 
state party platforms dedicated 60 percent of their external relations mentions to 
positive mentions of the military (104). Despite the similar proportions of the party 
platforms focusing on external relations, Democratic and Republican platforms 
emphasized distinct policies. Nationally and at the state level, Democrats prefer to 
embrace internationalism and promote diplomacy, while Republican prefer to stress 
America’s military capabilities. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to External Relations Policy Domain 
Freedom and Democracy 
Only a very small portion of the national platforms addressed issues of freedom 
and democracy, with little difference between the parties. State party platforms focused 
on these issues significantly more than the national parties, but no significant party 
differences exist at the state level either (Figure 3).  The bi-partisan consistency remains 
intact when we examine subcategories; both Democratic and Republican state parties 
dedicate a majority of their policy statements to direct mentions of democracy (202).  
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Figure 3: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Freedom and Democracy Policy Domain 
Political System  
Approximately 15 percent of each national party platform is dedicated to 
political system issues, compared with less than 10 percent of state party platforms. 
Again, there does not appear to be significant partisan differences with regard to focus 
on this policy domain at either level. Examining the subcategories where the state 
parties focused does indicate significant partisan differences (Figure 4). A majority of 
political system mentions in Democratic state party platforms were mentions of political 
authority (305), while a majority of Republican state party platform mentions focused 
on federalism and states’ rights (301). 
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Figure 4: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Political System Policy Domain 
Economy 
Although the economy was the issue most salient to voters in the 2008 election, 
economic concerns accounted for a relatively modest portion of platforms in both 
parties. The national Democratic Party platform dedicated 15 percent of the content to 
economic issues, a proportion half of the average Democratic state party platform 
(Figure 1). The national Republican Party dedicated approximately one-fifth of their 
platform to economic issues, again equivalent to half the average proportion in their 
state party counterparts. Although the key economic issues facing the United States are 
national economic issues, states emphasized the economy more. This may be because 
while the states have limited control on national economic policy, they often endure the 
brunt of the consequences. States have primary responsibility for caring for the indigent 
and coordinating services for the unemployed, and found their already-tight budgets 
strained even more. 
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Again, viewing only the aggregate patterns obscures real partisan differences 
(Figure 5). Nearly half of economic policy mentions in Democratic state party platforms 
reference support for market regulation (403) and infrastructure (411). Alternatively, 
nearly a third of economic references in Republican state party platforms focus on free 
market ideals (401). Although state Democratic and Republican party platforms dedicate 
similar portions of their platforms to the economy, careful analysis of platform content 
demonstrates how differently the state parties view the economic situation and the 
policy maneuvers they believe will remedy the situation. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Economic Policy Domain 
Welfare and Quality of Life 
 Issues of welfare and quality of life accounted for 15 and 9 percent of the Democratic 
and Republican national party platforms, respectively (Figure 1). Although the difference 
between the parties is relatively modest, the greater focus on these issues within the Democratic 
platform is as expected. This pattern is more intense at the state level. In state party platforms, 
Democratic platforms dedicated twice the proportion of their content to issues of welfare and 
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quality of life than their Republican counterparts (  Democratic    
  Republican 
Figure 6). Not only do Democrats at the state level differ in how much emphasis 
they dedicate to social welfare issues, when these issues are discussed, the parties focus 
on very different topics. State Democratic parties focus heavily on environmental 
protection issues (33 percent of all social welfare mentions) while state Republican 
Parties dedicate 60 percent of their social welfare discussions to negative mentions of 
the welfare state (505) and calls for educational expansion (506). 
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Figure 6: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Welfare and Quality of Life Policy Domain 
Fabric of Society  
Fabric of society issues account for 15 and 20 percent of Democratic and 
Republican national party platforms, respectively (Figure 1). While these are modest 
differences, they adhere to the expectation that Republicans would attach more 
importance to these issues. As with the previous issue category, at the state level the 
partisan differences are more dramatic. More than twice the proportion of coding units 
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in Republican state party platforms are dedicated to fabric of society issues than in 
Democratic state party platforms (  Democratic    
 Republican 
Figure 7). Republican state party platforms focus their attentions heavily on 
support for traditional morality; nearly 50 percent of statements in the fabric of society 
policy domain fall into category 603. Democratic state party platform divide their fabric 
of society policy mentions between two key categories – negative mentions of 
traditional morality (604) and law and order issues (605).Together, these account for 
nearly 60 percent of Democratic state platform mentions. While Republican state party 
platforms dedicate nearly half of their mentions to traditional moral politics, the 
Democratic state party platforms devote just over a quarter of their platform to 
progressive morality positions. I will explore these patterns in more detail in chapters 5 
and 6.  
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Figure 7: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Fabric of Society Policy Domain 
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Social Groups 
Focus on social groups varies significantly at both levels. At the national level, 
Republicans devote significantly more attention to social groups than their Democratic 
counterparts (18 to 11 percent, respectively). However, at the state level, this pattern is 
reversed. The difference between the Republican and Democratic state party platforms’ 
focus on social groups is dramatic (an 11 percent difference), but here Democrats lead 
the way (Figure 8). At the state level, both Democratic and Republican platforms focus 
heavily on positive mentions of labor groups and the working class (701), dedicating 48 
percent and 24 percent, respectively, of their social group mentions to this category. 
Republican state party platforms also demonstrate a real concern for farmers and 
agricultural policy, focusing a third of their social group mentions here (703). 
  Democratic     Republican 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Social Groups Policy Domain 
Conclusion 
From the discussion above we can see that there are significant differences in 
the types of policies Democrats and Republicans prefer to focus on. While this is not 
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unexpected, the dramatic differences between the behaviors of state parties and their 
national counterparts highlight divergent sets of priorities. While Democrats focused 
more on social welfare issues than Republicans at both levels, state party platforms 
indicate these issues are more salient at the state level. Democratic and Republican 
state party platforms devote the same proportion of space to the external relations 
policy domain, yet they focus on wildly different issues. 
Among other things, these findings highlight the independence of state political 
parties and the limited influence of the national parties. While the national parties seek 
to craft a party image, the successes of these endeavors remain highly dependent upon 
the willingness of the state parties to fall in line. Perhaps more interesting, the state 
parties vary dramatically from one another. The next two chapters are dedicated to 
sharing the striking variation of parties in our imagined two-party system. 
  
55 
CHAPTER 4 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
Describing State Party Platforms  
First, I begin with the simplest of descriptions, the length of state party 
platforms. Platform length is important because state parties that address many issues 
or discuss issues in greater depth will require more space. Alternatively, some state 
parties put out only brief platforms, addressing only a few issues with minimal details on 
policy preferences. Platform length can tell us something about platform complexity and 
a party’s views on the proper role of government. 
Nationally, Republican rhetoric and conservative ideology are generally 
accompanied by a professed preference for smaller government and fewer 
governmental regulations. If a state party prefers limited government, the platform is 
expected to address fewer policy positions and require less length. As such, I 
hypothesize that Republican state party platforms will be shorter than Democratic state 
party platforms (Hypothesis 4.1). 
 Hypothesis 4.1: Republican state party platforms will be shorter than 
Democratic state party platforms. 
In addition, the tradition of states’ rights and independence are strong forces in 
the American south and western states. These traditions emphasize decentralized 
power and often are accompanied by a general desire for less governmental control. 
Therefore, I expect state party platforms in these regions to be shorter than the 
platforms in the northeast and Midwest (Hypothesis 4.2).  
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 Hypothesis 4.2: State party platforms in the south and west will be shorter 
than state party platforms in the northeast and Midwest. 
Results: Platform Length  
A cursory examination of platforms indicates that both national party platforms 
are longer than any state party platform, but state party platform lengths vary greatly. 
On average, state party platforms are 4,500 words in length, with a median word count 
of 2,830 (Table 3). Parties differed significantly in platform length, and as expected, 
state Republican parties tend towards shorter state party platforms than their 
Democratic counterparts (Figure 9). Colorado Democrats produced the longest state 
party platform at 23,046 words in length, compared to the shortest platform from 
Florida Republicans at only 214 words in length.79 The mean length of state Republican 
platforms is 3,867, compared to the 5,237 words for state Democratic platforms.  
 Word Count  Coding Units  
 Democratic Republican All Democratic Republican All 
Mean 5,237 3,867 4,501 265 174 216 
Median 2,701 2,945 2,830 163 124 158 
Minimum 380 214 214 19 14 14 
Maximum 23,046 16,142 23,046 1,016 777 1,016 
Standard 
Deviation 
5,932 3,508 4,832 266 165 221 
National Platform 32,418 23,549 - - - 1,098 1,007 - - - 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of State and National Party Platforms 
The mean word counts only tell us part of the story. When we compare the 
median lengths of the state party platforms, the partisan differences fade rapidly. The 
median length of state Democratic platforms is 2,701 words- 250 words less than the 
median Republican state platform. However, the state party platforms falling above the 
median word count are split nearly evenly between Democratic and Republican 
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platforms (45 percent to 55 percent, respectively). Platforms falling at the extreme ends 
of the spectrum significantly skew interpretations based on mean length. 
Figure 9: Length of State Party Platforms, Word Count  
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Simply looking at word counts overstates the differences between the parties to 
some extent and writing styles can significantly impact word counts, even if the 
substantive content does not change (Figure 10). Some state party platforms rely 
heavily on bullet lists, while others prefer to write out full paragraphs. Some platforms 
are written succinctly, while others are less concerned with brevity. North Dakota 
Republicans, for example, preface each policy statement with a series of statements 
supporting their reasoning. To examine the impact of writing styles on platform length, 
we can look at the number of coding units present in each platform (Table 3).80 Each 
separate policy position statement constitutes a separate coding unit, regardless of the 
number of words used. This means that a gay marriage statement like, “We oppose the 
Defense of Marriage Act”81 accounts for the same number of coding units as, “(We 
support) Missouri’s constitutional amendment… clearly stating that only marriages 
between one man and one woman will be valid and recognized.”82  
State party platforms have a mean of 216 coding units, with Florida and 
Maryland Republicans having the fewest and Colorado Democrats having the most 
(Figure 10). Consistent with the word count measure and hypothesis 4.1, Republican 
state party platforms generally contain fewer coding units than Democratic state party 
platforms. However, this tendency should not be overstated; sixteen of the 40 party 
platforms with the fewest coding units are Democratic platforms.  
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Coding procedures and policy categories are discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
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 2010 Iowa Democratic State Party Platform. 
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 2008 Missouri Republican State Party Platform. 
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Figure 10: State Party Platform Length, Coding Units 
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Further investigation makes clear that partisanship is only one factor 
contributing to platform length. To understand fully state party platform length 
patterns, we must consider regional patterns. States are categorized by region using the 
four basic US Census regions – Northeast, South, Midwest, and West (Table 4). The 
conservative tendencies of the American South and west, and the generalized 
preference for small government suggests that state party platforms in these regions 
would be shorter than platforms from the Northeast or Midwest. Hypothesis 4.2 is 
supported only in part. As predicted, state party platforms from western states tend to 
use fewer words than average; 66 percent fall below the median (Table 5).83 However, 
contrary to hypothesis 4.2, state party platforms from the South are not particularly 
concise. State party platforms from southern states are evenly distributed around the 
median. While southern political culture emphasizes state control and small 
government the South also has a long and colorful history in big government behavior. 
The American South has used substantial government presence in the lives of 
individuals to enforce a variety of social regulations including slavery, racial segregation, 
and contemporary morality policies. 
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 If we examine length by region using the number of coding units, rather than word counts, the results 
are comparable; western state party platforms are shorter and Midwestern platforms are longer. 
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States RegionC RegionB 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont 
New England 
Northeast 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania Mid-Atlantic 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
South Atlantic 
South 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee East South Central 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas West South Central 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin East North Central 
Midwest Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota 
West North Central 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, 
Nevada, Wyoming 
Mountain 
West 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington Pacific 
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf 
Table 4 States by US Census Regions 
 
 Northeast South Midwest West 
Longest Quartile 8% (1) 26% (6) 37% (7) 23% (6) 
Second Quartile 25% (3) 22% (5) 47% (9) 12% (3) 
Third Quartile 50% (6) 17% (4) 11% (2) 31% (8) 
Shortest Quartile 17% (2) 35% (8) 5% (1) 35% (9) 
 100% (12) 100% (23) 100% (19) 100% (26) 
Chi-Squared: 18.84, p<.027 
Table 5 State Party Platforms, by Length and Region 
 
Expectations for State Party Platform Ideology  
Existing studies on party platforms focus almost exclusively on the ideological 
positioning of platforms and, while not sufficient, this is an ideal place to begin. The 
national Democratic Party generally reflects more liberal policy positions. Therefore, I 
expect Democratic state party platforms to include significantly more liberal policy 
preferences than Republican state party platforms, and Republican state party 
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platforms to contain significantly more conservative policy preferences than Democratic 
state party platforms (Hypothesis 4.3). 
 Hypothesis 4.3: Democratic state party platforms will be significantly more 
liberal than Republican state party platforms and Republican state party 
platforms will be significantly more conservative than Democratic state party 
platforms.  
The coalitions supporting the Democratic Party tend to be more varied. 
Democratic support is highest in urban areas where demographic diversity is high, and 
along the coasts. In addition, the Democratic Party has a long history of incorporating 
conservative factions, even when the conservative members may appear to be suited 
better for a Republican identity. All of these observations lead to the expectation that 
there will be significantly more ideological diversity in Democratic state party platforms 
than in Republican state party platforms (Hypothesis 4.4). 
 Hypothesis 4.4: There will be significantly more ideological diversity in 
Democratic state party platforms than in Republican state party platforms. 
Partisan affiliation is not the only factor I expect to influence the ideology of 
state party platforms. The US states vary widely on an assortment of measures including 
ideological temperaments. It is easy to recognize that Massachusetts is more liberal 
than Utah, and that Mississippi leans further to the right than Oregon. In states with 
clear ideological leanings, state party platforms should reflect these patters. In states 
where the median voter is further to the right, I expect more conservative state party 
platforms from both parties (Hypothesis 4.5). Alternatively, in more liberal states, I 
expect more liberal platforms, regardless of party (Hypothesis 4.6). The reasons for 
these expectations are simple and intuitive. In a conservative state, like Utah, the 
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median voter is positioned further to the right than the median voter of a more liberal 
state like Massachusetts. As such, in order for the Democratic Party of Utah to remain 
viable, they must avoid alienating too large of a segment of the electorate. I anticipate 
this desire to remain electorally viable to incentivize state platform committees to 
develop platforms which reflect the preferences of the state population more 
accurately. 
 Hypothesis 4.5: State party platforms in conservative states will be 
significantly more conservative than in liberal states, regardless of party. 
 Hypothesis 4.6: State party platforms in liberal states will be significantly 
liberal than in conservative states, regardless of party. 
The competitive environment of a state is expected to influence the ideological 
positions of state party platforms as well. I hypothesize that state party platforms in 
more competitive states will be significantly closer in ideology to the national party 
platforms than in less competitive states (Hypothesis 4.7). In less competitive states, the 
parties have the freedom and incentive to more freely move across the ideological 
spectrum in response to local conditions. The majority party is politically safe and can 
spend less time softening their statements. The minority party begins with a 
disadvantage and risks little by rebelling from the national standard. 
 Hypothesis 4.7:  State party platforms in more competitive states will be 
significantly closer in ideology to the national party platforms that in less 
competitive states.  
Measuring State Party Platform Ideology 
I employ two methods of calculating right-left ideological measures. The first is 
the standard CMP RILE additive index that is used extensively in comparative political 
research (Budge, et al.  1986; Budge 1987; 2001; Klingemann, et al. 1994; 2006; Laver 
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and Budge 1992; Laver, et al. 2003; Laver 2000; 2001, for example). This measure is 
calculated by adding the proportions of all of the conservative policy position categories 
and subtracting from this the proportions of all of the liberal policy categories. This raw 
measure is then scaled for interpretation. Table 6 provides a list of the issues deemed 
conservative and liberal in the CMP RILE measure. The final scaled measure ranges from 
2.78 to 7.93, from most liberal to most conservative.  
 CMP RILE = ∑ (conservative) - ∑ (liberal) 
 RILE Scale = (CMP RILE + 100) / 20 
The state party platforms are ranked by their CMP ideology score in Table 7. It is 
clear that most state party platforms conform to the ideological patterns expected. 
Consistent with hypothesis 4.3, the Democratic state party platforms are generally more 
liberal than Republican platforms. Moreover, Republican state party platforms are more 
conservative than Democratic state party platforms, consistent with hypothesis 4.4.  
A scatterplot of scaled CMP ideology scores for the states is shown in Figure 11. 
The most interesting points in this simple scatterplot are where the state party 
platforms do not fit neatly into the expected pattern. The Massachusetts Republican 
platform, for example, has a scaled CMP ideology score of 4.56 – more liberal than ten 
Democratic state party platforms and the Arizona Democratic Party platform has a 
scaled CMP score of 5.38 – more conservative than three Republican state party 
platforms. Moreover, simply by observing the ideological ranges of state party platforms 
using the scaled CMP measure, we see that Republican state party platforms have a 
greater range – 3.37 versus 2.60 points, contradicting hypothesis 4.5.   
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  CMP RILE Method Franzmann & Kaiser Method 
 DOMAIN 1: External Relations   
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive - - - Valence 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative - - - Valence 
103 Anti-Imperialism Liberal Valence 
104 Military: Positive Conservative Conservative 
105 Military: Negative Liberal Liberal 
106 Peace Liberal Liberal 
107 Internationalism: Positive Liberal Liberal 
109 Internationalism: Negative - - - Conservative 
    
 DOMAIN 2: Freedom and Democracy   
200 Libertarianism - - - Conservative 
201 Freedom and Human Rights Conservative Valence 
202 Democracy Liberal Valence 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive Conservative Conservative 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative - - - Valence 
    
 DOMAIN 3: Political System   
301 Federalism/States’ Rights - - - Conservative 
302 Centralisation - - - Valence 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency - - - Conservative 
304 Political Corruption - - - Valence 
305 Political Authority Conservative Valence 
    
 DOMAIN 4: Economy   
401 Free Market Economy Conservative Conservative 
402 Incentives Conservative Valence 
403 Market Regulation Liberal Liberal 
404 Economic Planning Liberal Valence 
405 Corporatism/ Mixed Economy - - - Valence 
406 Protectionism: Positive Liberal Valence 
407 Protectionism: Negative Conservative Valence 
408 Economic Goals - - - Valence 
409 Keynesian Demand Management - - - Valence 
410 Economic Growth - - - Conservative 
411 Technology and Infrastructure - - - Liberal 
412 Controlled Economy Liberal Valence 
413 Nationalisation Liberal Valence 
414 Economic Orthodoxy Conservative Conservative 
415 Marxist Analysis  - - - Valence 
416 Sustainability - - - Liberal 
Table 6: Ideology of Coding Categories 
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Table 6: Ideology of Coding Categories 
In addition the traditional CMP measure, I include a second measure of state 
platform ideology. While the CMP ideology measure provides a simple and intuitive 
estimate and is widely used in comparative political research, it is, in some respects, 
flawed. One potential problem with the CMP measure is that it assumes a static issue 
environment where the ideological bend of issues does not fluctuate over time. The 
labeling of categories as conservative and liberal stems from an analysis of western 
European parties in the late 1990s, and there are legitimate concerns about the 
applicability of this categorization to American state political parties in 2008. The 
(Continued) 
  CMP Franzmann & Kaiser Method 
    
 DOMAIN 5: Welfare and Quality of Life   
501 Environmental Protection - - - Liberal 
502 Culture - - - Liberal 
503 Equality - - - Liberal 
504 Welfare State: Positive Liberal Liberal 
505 Welfare State: Negative Conservative Conservative 
506 Education Expansion Liberal Liberal 
507 Education Limitation - - - Conservative 
508 The Myth of Global Warming - - - Conservative 
    
 DOMAIN 6: Fabric of Society   
601 National Way of life: Positive Conservative Conservative 
602 National Way of life: Negative - - - Valence 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive Conservative Conservative 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative - - - Liberal 
605 Law and Order Conservative Conservative 
606 Civic Mindedness Conservative Liberal 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive  - - - Liberal 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative - - - Conservative 
    
 DOMAIN 7: Social Groups   
701 Labour Groups: Positive  Liberal Liberal 
702 Labour Groups: Negative - - - Conservative 
703 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive - - - Liberal 
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups - - - Valence 
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups - - - Liberal 
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups - - - Liberal 
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development of this measure and its rigid assumptions pose significant validity 
concerns. More importantly, the CMP measure fails to account for the presence of 
valence issues in the issue environment. Taking these concerns into account, I include 
the ideology of American state party platforms using Franzmann and Kaiser’s (2006) 
measure, which provides a floating ideology measure that allows for variation between 
elections and directly addresses valence issues. This is the ideology measure of state 
party platforms that I will use for the duration of this study. To identify the ideological 
leaning of issue areas, each coding category is regressed with the dummy party variable; 
where partisanship fails to reach statistical significance we have valance issues. These 
issues are ignored in the CMP measure, but even without a significant ideological bend 
these issues may be politically salient. Where partisanship is statistically significant, a 
positive coefficient indicates a liberal issue and a negative coefficient indicates a 
conservative issue. Larger beta coefficients in the dummy regressions indicate more 
ideologically charged issues. The issues falling into each ideological category are 
displayed in Table 7. 
In order to calculate the ideological position of the state party platforms, the 
proportions of all conservative, liberal, and valence issue categories are summed into 
separate variables. Once a raw measure is calculated it is scaled for analysis on a -10 to 
+10 scale. This final scaled ideology measure for all state party platforms ranges from -
7.36 to 8.08 from most liberal to most conservative.  
 Ideology = [ ∑ (conservative) - ∑ (liberal) ] / [ ∑ (conservative) + ∑ (liberal) + ∑ 
(valence) ] 
 Ideology Scale = Ideology * 10 
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Figure 11 CMP Ideology Scaled, by State 
Figure 12: Franzmann and Kaiser Ideology Scaled, by State 
Using the Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) ideology measure in place of the CMP 
measure, the ranking of individual state party platforms change significantly, although 
the general pattern remains the same (Figure 12). Consistent with hypotheses 4.3 and 
4.4, Democratic Party platforms generally are more liberal and Republican Party 
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platforms more conservative. In addition, the Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) results also 
show a greater degree of polarization between Democratic and Republican state party 
platforms (Figure 12). Now there are only a few cases of ideological overlapping 
between state parties – the Alabama Democrats are unusually conservative, and the 
Massachusetts and Indiana Republicans are abnormally liberal (Table 7). 
Despite the changes seen when we shift from the traditional, yet flawed, CMP 
measure , the ideological range of Republican state party platforms remains higher than 
the ideological range of Democratic platforms, inconsistent with hypothesis 4.5. The 
greater diversity of Democratic constituencies led to the expectation that Democratic 
state party platforms would show a greater degree of ideological diversity. However, 
regardless of the ideological measure used, Republican state party platforms show a 
greater ideological range. Given that 2008 was a general election year that favored the 
Democratic Party at the national level, and the partisan winds shifted to favor the 
Republicans in 2010, it could be that the ideological diversity among Democratic and 
Republican platforms was an artifact of the election cycles. However, in this analysis, the 
platform year proved to be statistically insignificant. Additional research will be needed 
to uncover reasons for these relationships and confirm these patterns hold over time. 
At the national level, the Republican Party appears to be operating a “small-tent” 
organization. This perception of the Republican Party as reluctant to diversify has 
resulted in dramatic claims of an impending Republican demise. These cries became 
louder following the 2008 November elections. Yet, despite the limited constituency 
groups, Republicans control a majority of state legislatures and a majority of governors’ 
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mansions. This degree of political success in the states may be due, in some part, to the 
independence of the state parties and their decision to prioritize local conditions over 
national ones. 
It may be that while the national Republican Party is streamlining their message, 
the state Republican parties are branching out. This is not to suggest that the state 
Republican parties do not share common values or ideologies, but evidence does 
suggest that state Republican parties are compelled to pursue their own local interests. 
In part, this is unsurprising. State parties focus on electing state officials, rather than 
national candidates, but it is noteworthy that the state Republican parties often find 
success in distancing themselves from their counterparts in other states and at the 
national level. As you will see in the next chapter, the greater ideological diversity of 
state Republican parties is not the only way in which they contradict our expectations or 
challenge conventional wisdom.  
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Rank State Party CMP 
Scaled 
Rank State Party Franzmann & 
Kaiser Scaled 
1 Mississippi Democrat 2.78 1 Mississippi Democrat -7.31 
2 Michigan Democrat 2.79 2 Montana Democrat -7.25 
3 New Mexico Democrat 2.83 3 Washington Democrat -7.04 
4 South Carolina Democrat 2.89 4 Iowa Democrat -6.95 
5 Texas Democrat 2.93 5 Hawaii Democrat -6.77 
6 Indiana Democrat 3.11 6 California Democrat -6.46 
7 Washington Democrat 3.24 7 Nevada Democrat -6.43 
8 Maine Democrat 3.25 8 Virginia Democrat -6.42 
9 Colorado Democrat 3.35 9 Wyoming Democrat -6.34 
10 Nevada Democrat 3.41 10 New Mexico Democrat -6.30 
11 Vermont Democrat 3.41 11 Colorado Democrat -6.20 
12 Iowa Democrat 3.53 12 Nebraska Democrat -6.17 
13 Nebraska Democrat 3.54 13 Wisconsin Democrat -6.08 
14 Massachusetts Democrat 3.62 14 Kansas Democrat -6.04 
15 Wisconsin Democrat 3.65 15 Texas Democrat -6.02 
16 California Democrat 3.72 16 Vermont Democrat -6.00 
17 Montana Democrat 3.77 17 West Virginia Democrat -5.95 
18 Hawaii Democrat 3.80 18 Michigan Democrat -5.76 
19 Virginia Democrat 3.87 19 New Hampshire Democrat -5.63 
20 Minnesota Democrat 3.91 20 Maine Democrat -5.63 
21 Kansas Democrat 3.93 21 Minnesota Democrat -5.53 
22 Idaho Democrat 3.98 22 Idaho Democrat -5.28 
23 Wyoming Democrat 4.07 23 Indiana Democrat -5.02 
24 Arkansas Democrat 4.26 24 South Dakota Democrat -4.79 
25 Connecticut Democrat 4.44 25 South Carolina Democrat -4.64 
26 South Dakota Democrat 4.44 26 Massachusetts Democrat -4.11 
27 New Hampshire Democrat 4.52 27 Arkansas Democrat -4.10 
28 Massachusetts Republican 4.56 28 Arizona Democrat -3.90 
29 Georgia Democrat 4.67 29 Delaware Democrat -3.81 
30 Delaware Democrat 4.71 30 North Carolina Democrat -3.35 
31 Utah Democrat 4.74 31 Alaska Democrat -3.22 
32 West Virginia Democrat 4.99 32 Connecticut Democrat -2.87 
33 North Carolina Democrat 5.00 33 Georgia Democrat -2.86 
34 Alaska Democrat 5.00 34 Utah Democrat -2.28 
35 Oklahoma Democrat 5.00 35 Oregon Democrat -1.90 
36 Alabama Democrat 5.00 36 Oklahoma Democrat -1.73 
37 North Dakota Republican 5.02 37 Massachusetts Republican -0.64 
38 Indiana Republican 5.18 38 Alabama Democrat 0.01 
39 Oregon Democrat 5.28 39 Indiana Republican 0.19 
40 Arizona Democrat 5.38 40 South Dakota Republican 1.44 
Table 7: Ideology of State Party Platforms, Ranked by State 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued) 
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Rank State Party CMP 
Scaled 
Rank State Party Franzmann & 
Kaiser Scaled 
41 Idaho Republican 5.50 41 Idaho Republican 2.29 
42 Alabama Republican 5.53 42 Montana Republican 2.36 
43 Virginia Republican 5.67 43 Mississippi Republican 2.57 
44 Nevada Republican 5.71 44 Florida Republican 2.67 
45 New Hampshire Republican 5.81 45 West Virginia Republican 2.68 
46 Vermont Republican 5.83 46 Nebraska Republican 2.71 
47 Michigan Republican 5.87 47 New Hampshire Republican 2.71 
48 Montana Republican 5.93 48 Vermont Republican 2.73 
49 West Virginia Republican 6.09 49 Connecticut Republican 3.04 
50 Texas Republican 6.09 50 Maryland Republican 3.08 
51 Wyoming Republican 6.10 51 Colorado Republican 3.16 
52 New Mexico Republican 6.15 52 Illinois Republican 3.40 
53 South Dakota Republican 6.17 53 Arkansas Republican 3.60 
54 Washington Republican 6.19 54 Utah Republican 3.64 
55 Minnesota Republican 6.22 55 Pennsylvania Republican 3.64 
56 Colorado Republican 6.30 56 Michigan Republican 3.66 
57 Arkansas Republican 6.36 57 Washington Republican 3.76 
58 Georgia Republican 6.41 58 New Mexico Republican 3.80 
59 Illinois Republican 6.50 59 Oregon Republican 3.95 
60 Iowa Republican 6.57 60 Wyoming Republican 4.05 
61 Maine Republican 6.57 61 Alabama Republican 4.12 
62 Utah Republican 6.59 62 Iowa Republican 4.22 
63 Oklahoma Republican 6.61 63 California Republican 4.38 
64 Oregon Republican 6.62 64 North Carolina Republican 4.65 
65 Nebraska Republican 6.63 65 Missouri Republican 4.91 
66 North Carolina Republican 6.65 66 Hawaii Republican 5.00 
67 Hawaii Republican 6.67 67 Wisconsin Republican 5.04 
68 Mississippi Republican 6.67 68 Texas Republican 5.07 
69 Arizona Republican 6.72 69 Kansas Republican 5.18 
70 Florida Republican 6.79 70 Minnesota Republican 5.27 
71 Kansas Republican 6.92 71 South Carolina Republican 5.43 
72 Connecticut Republican 6.96 72 Nevada Republican 5.48 
73 California Republican 6.98 73 Oklahoma Republican 5.61 
74 Missouri Republican 7.03 74 Arizona Republican 5.63 
75 Wisconsin Republican 7.10 75 Virginia Republican 5.71 
76 Pennsylvania Republican 7.34 76 Louisiana Republican 6.01 
77 Maryland Republican 7.50 77 Alaska Republican 6.58 
78 Louisiana Republican 7.51 78 Maine Republican 7.25 
79 South Carolina Republican 7.56 79 North Dakota Republican 7.44 
80 Alaska Republican 7.93 80 Georgia Republican 8.08 
Table 7: Ranked Ideology of State Party Platforms  
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Testing the Impact of State Ideology on State Party Platform Ideology 
I utilize Carsey and Harden’s (2010) state ideology measure to gauge state 
ideology. Carsey and Harden (2010) use a combination of National Annenberg Election 
Surveys (NAES) and Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) data to develop 
measures of ideology, partisanship, and policy mood of the states. Table 8 displays 
Carsey and Harden’s (2010) state ideology scores and rankings for 2008.84 Carsey and 
Harden’s (2010) measure correlates highly with previous measures, including Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver’s (1993, 2006) measure based upon CBS News / New York Times 
polls. 
I employ two measures of political competitiveness in this analysis. The first 
measure of political competitiveness is that of district competitiveness from Holbrook 
and Van Dunk (1993). This measure is based upon state legislative district-level state 
legislative outcomes and includes four distinct measures, including the winning 
candidate’s percentage of the popular vote, the margin of victory of the winning 
candidate, whether or not the seat is considered “safe,” and whether or not the race 
was contested. District competiveness scores are averaged to obtain state-level scores, 
and higher values indicate higher levels of district competitiveness. 
  
                                                     
84
 The Carson and Harden (2010) scores were calculated by me using the authors’ data and STATA files. 
The authors graciously make this information available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14032. 
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Rank State State Ideology Rank State State Ideology 
1 Alabama 1.605556 26 Nebraska 1.84127 
2 Oklahoma 1.617021 27 New Hampshire 1.842795 
3 Mississippi 1.648649 28 Nevada 1.844086 
4 Louisiana 1.65641 29 Ohio 1.852393 
5 Utah 1.659664 30 Virginia 1.857697 
6 Tennessee 1.665505 31 Delaware 1.868421 
7 Arkansas 1.681319 32 Michigan 1.870332 
8 West Virginia 1.690141 33 Maine 1.871681 
9 South Carolina 1.690355 34 Colorado 1.895792 
10 Georgia 1.719786 35 Wisconsin 1.911612 
11 Texas 1.719904 36 Oregon 1.915493 
12 South Dakota 1.752577 37 Maryland 1.917733 
13 Wyoming 1.765957 38 Pennsylvania 1.936104 
14 Iowa 1.784211 39 Illinois 1.936787 
15 Kentucky 1.785354 40 New Mexico 1.941176 
16 Indiana 1.786422 41 Washington 1.971774 
17 North Dakota 1.794872 42 California 1.972582 
18 North Carolina 1.801117 43 Minnesota 1.982922 
19 Montana 1.804688 44 Connecticut 1.99022 
20 Kansas 1.804945 45 New Jersey 1.99887 
21 Idaho 1.80625 46 Rhode Island 2.00000 
22 Missouri 1.810209 47 New York 2.020752 
23 Florida 1.815814 48 Massachusetts 2.049658 
24 Arizona 1.823219 49 Hawaii 2.075758 
25 Alaska 1.838235 50 Vermont 2.141026 
Source: Carsey and Harden (2010) 
Table 8: Carsey and Harden's 2008 State Ideology Scores 
In addition, I include an updated folded Ranney index (Biddy, et al 1990). The 
Ranney index combines measures on three dimensions related to partisan control over 
elected offices (Thomas and Van Dunk, 1993). The index takes into account the 
proportion of seats held by each party in the state legislature and the percentage of 
votes each party receives in elections for statewide offices. The index also considers 
how long the respective parties have controlled legislative seats and statewide offices to 
account for long term partisan success. Finally, the Ranney index incorporates how 
frequently the states have operated under divided government. When combined, these 
three dimensions provide an index of state partisan competition ranging from 0 to 1, 
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where a score of 0 indicates a strong Republican dominance and a score of 1 indicates a 
strong Democratic dominance (Kenney and Rice 1985). A score of .5 would indicate a 
perfect partisan balance.85 
Results: The Impact of State Ideology on State Party Platform Ideology 
Table 9 displays the relevant results for hypotheses 4.6 and 4.7. Model 1 is a 
stripped down test that shows the impact of state ideology and party on the Franzmann 
and Kaiser’s (2006) scaled ideology score for each state party platform. Consistent with 
hypothesis 4.6, the results indicate that conservative states are more likely to produce 
conservative state party platforms, even when we control for the partisan affiliation of 
the platforms. The results are unambiguous and highly significant.  
Model 2 takes into account other variables that might be expected to influence 
the ideological scores of state party platforms, but only one of these additional variables 
reaches statistical significance – platform length measured by coding units (Table 9). The 
results indicate that state party platforms with fewer coding units are more 
conservative. While statistically significant, the diminutive coefficient indicates the 
effect is modest. These results provide support for hypotheses 4.6 and 4.7. State party 
platforms in conservative states are more conservative than in liberal states, regardless 
of party, and state party platforms in liberal states appear significantly more liberal than 
in conservative states, even when partisanship is controlled for. 
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 The folded Ranney index: 
.9000 to 1.0000: one-party Democratic 
.7000 to .8999: modified one-party Democratic 
.3000 to .6999: two-party 
.1000 to .2999: modified one-party Republican 
.0000 to .0999: one-party Republican 
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 Model 1 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Dependent Variable Franzmann and Kaiser Scaled State 
Party Platform Ideology 
Franzmann and Kaiser Scaled 
State Party Platform Ideology 
State Ideology -4.18 *** 
(1.55) 
-3.45 * 
(2.09) 
Party -9.09 *** 
(0.38) 
-8.86 *** 
(0.41) 
Words - - - 0.00 
(0.00) 
Coding Units - - - -0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
District Competitiveness - - - -0.01 
(0.02) 
Ranney Fold - - - 1.95 
(2.36) 
Election - - - 0.00 
(0.03) 
Confederate - - - 0.89 
(0.56) 
Constant 11.75 *** 
(2.85) 
9.23 ** 
(3.98) 
Adjusted R
2
 .88 .89 
N  80 79 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 9: Contributing Factors to State Party Platform Ideology 
Hypothesis 4.7 suggests that state party platforms in more competitive states 
will be significantly closer in ideology to the national party platforms than in less 
competitive states. In order to test this hypothesis I used the Franzmann and Kaiser 
(2006) method to calculate the ideology of the national Democratic and Republican 
Party platforms. I then calculated the distance between the national party platform and 
each state party platform. The measure was calculated by subtracting the Franzmann 
and Kaiser (2006) scaled score of the national Democratic Party platform from each 
Democratic state party platform (the same process was used for the Republican Party 
platforms). This simple distance measure indicates how ideologically distinct the state 
party platforms are from their national counterparts. 
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 Model 3 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Dependent Variable Ideological Distance Between 
National and State Party Platform 
Ideological Distance Between 
National and State Party Platform 
State Ideology -3.45 
(2.13) 
-2.77 
(2.16) 
Party -7.63 *** 
(0.40) 
-7.65 *** 
(0.40) 
District Competitiveness -0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Ranney Fold - - - 1.84 
(2.41) 
Election -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
Confederate - - - 0.97 * 
(0.58) 
Constant 10.46 ** 
(3.31) 
7.56 * 
(4.11) 
Adjusted R
2
 .83 0.84 
N  79 79 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 10: Contributing Factors to Ideological Distance Between State and National Parties 
Model 3 is the core model used to test hypothesis 4.7 and here only partisanship 
is statistically significant in trying to explain the variation in ideological distance between 
state party platforms and national party platforms (Table 10). Contrary to hypothesis 
4.7, the competitiveness of the state does not appear to matter. Model 4 is a fully 
specified model and again, the competitiveness of the state political environment 
appears insignificant, regardless of the measure used. Only partisanship and the status 
as a former confederate state surpass the generous p < .10 threshold.  
My results suggest that state ideology influences state party platform ideology 
but the political competitiveness of the states do not. From this I conclude that the 
variations in the ideologies of state party platforms are not strategic political 
maneuvers, but rather sincere ideological differences among parties sharing Democratic 
and Republican labels. If Republicans in the different states have sets of preferences 
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distinct from their neighbors and the national party, we have real evidence that the 
American party system is a pluralistic one, rather than binary. 
Conclusion 
State party platforms provide state parties with an opportunity to express party 
values and articulate policy preferences without sound bite editing – a rare opportunity 
for unmediated party communication with interest groups, activists, and the public. The 
process of revision and compromise within the state parties provides a fascinating 
window into the parties’ policy preferences and political priorities, and a wonderful 
opportunity to assess the independence of state parties. Now that the purpose and 
development of state party platforms is clear, the next chapter will discuss the 
platforms utilized in this study and will provide a detailed description of the coding 
scheme used to assess platform content. 
Although political competitiveness does not significantly influence state party 
platform ideology, it is clear that platforms crafted in more conservative states are more 
conservative, regardless of party. Party platforms crafted in conservative states appear 
to incorporate state ideology, resulting in more conservative platforms from both the 
state Democratic and Republican parties. These results lend further evidence to the 
claim that Democratic and Republican party labels are malleable and subject to local 
conditions. 
Contrary to expectations, I find more ideological diversity in Republican state 
party platforms than in their Democratic counterparts. While the Republican parties at 
all levels share many values and priorities, they are less consistent than their Democratic 
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rivals and less homogenous than popular culture would suggest. This finding 
corroborates earlier findings of state party independence. Furthermore, Republicans 
defying expectations is a behavior we will see repeated in the next chapter. 
  
80 
CHAPTER 5 
NOT OUR CONCERN: ISSUE OWNERSHIP & STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
A gathering of Democrats is more sweaty, disorderly, offhand, and 
rowdy than a gathering of Republicans; it is also likely to be more 
cheerful, imaginative, tolerant of dissent, and skillful at the game of give-
and-take. A gathering of Republicans is more respectable, sober, 
purposeful, and businesslike than a gathering of Democrats; it is also 
likely to be more self-righteous, pompous, cut-and-dried, and just plain 
boring.86 
In this chapter, I employ issue ownership theory to analyze the content of state 
party platforms. Issue ownership theory suggests that parties are perceived as more 
competent and better suited to handle some issues and these are the issues owned by 
the parties (Petrocik  1996). This perceived ownership generally is thought to be a 
consequence of past performance and long-standing partisan constituencies, lending 
great stability to ownership over time. In order for the electorate to perceive ownership, 
a party must demonstrate that they are committed more to addressing the issue and 
better suited for handling the issue than the opposing party. Table 11 lists the issues 
owned by the major parties. Democrats typically enjoy advantages on issues of social 
welfare (education, healthcare, etc.), environmental protection, civil rights, etc. Issues 
like national defense, traditional moral values, deficit control, and limiting government 
spending are owned by the Republican Party. 
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Democrat Owned Issues Republican Owned Issues Performance Issues 
Education Defense Foreign Policy 
Healthcare Government Spending Economy 
Helping the Middle Class Taxes  
Senior Citizens Religion/Morality  
Jobs/Labor Crime  
Environment Drug Abuse  
Civil Liberties Civil & Social Order  
Civil Rights Economic Regulation  
Social Welfare Increasing US Influence  
Farmers & Agriculture Controlling Inflation  
Relations Among Social Groups 
and Classes 
Reducing the Deficit  
Women’s Interests   
Protecting Social Security   
Keeping US Out of War   
Poverty   
Source: Petrocik (1996); Petrocik, Benoit, Hansen (2004) 
Table 11: Issue Ownership Categories 
 Persuasiveness regarding competence and focus is critical. Many voters are 
concerned primarily with making sure the winning candidate will address effectively the 
issues they deem most important; generally, they are concerned less about the precise 
policies instituted to solve the problem (Petrocik, Benoit, Hansen 2003). Because parties 
and candidates seek to market and promote themselves within political campaigns, 
rather than to change minds about specific policies, agenda control can be critical to 
party success (Petrocik 1996). My test of issue ownership theory in state party platforms 
begins with two simple hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 5.1: Democratic state party platforms will focus on Democrat 
owned issues significantly more than issues owned by Republicans. 
 Hypothesis 5.2: Republican state party platforms will focus on Republican 
owned issues significantly more than issues owned by Democrats. 
While many issues are owned consistently by one party over time, other issues 
are more vulnerable (Petrocik 1996). Issues like the national economy and foreign policy 
are not consistently owned by either party but shift back and forth in response to 
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perceived or expected performance. These performance issues are not owned, but 
rather leased by the parties. These performance issues can be especially important in 
election cycles affected by financial crises and international threats. Because of the 
fiscal crisis at play and the multiple active military engagements of the US between 2008 
and 2010, I expect performance issues to account for a significant, but minority portion 
of state party platforms. 
 Hypothesis 5.3: Performance issues will account for a significant, but 
minority portion of state party platforms. 
Issue ownership is important because voters reward candidates who run on 
salient party-owned issues, and partisan voters identify issues owned by their party as 
more salient than issues owned by the opposing party. When candidates set the agenda 
to focus on issues their party owns, they encourage voters to use these issues to guide 
voting decisions. 
Beyond US National Politics  
Previous research has found compelling, if not conclusive, evidence of issue 
ownership at play in American elections. Studies have found support for issue 
ownership theory in presidential and congressional elections – in campaign 
advertisements, speeches, and debates (Benoit and Hansen 2004; Herrnson and Curry 
2011; Petrocik 1996, Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2004). Despite significant empirical 
support for issue ownership theory, the tendency to focus on American presidential 
elections severely limits the generalizability of the theory. While developed in the 
American context, there is evidence that the core of issue ownership theory applies 
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internationally (Belanger 2003; Pogorelis, et al. 2005). Parties in other western-style 
democracies appear to hold advantages on some issues across time linked to 
perceptions of competency. Moreover, when issue ownership is examined in a 
comparative context, evidence suggests that parties generally attempt to develop areas 
of issue expertise, rather than simply adopting opposing positions on a common set of 
topics (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). 
Even as researchers begin testing the applicability of issue ownership theory 
internationally, efforts to test the theory within the American states or beyond 
presidential (and to a lesser extent, congressional elections) remains limited. Further 
research at the state level is essential because state politics governments are dominated 
by a set of policy issues distinct from those dominating national politics and many of 
these issues are owned by Democrats. Typically, issues perceived as most salient in 
presidential elections are owned by Republicans and research has shown repeatedly 
that the Republican saliency advantage in national elections often compels Democrats 
to diverge from their preferred topics (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003; Damore 
2004; 2005). These observations of national party behavior lead me to hypothesize that 
Republican state party platforms will concentrate on issues owned by their party more 
consistently than Democratic state party platforms. 
 Hypothesis 5.4: Republican state party platforms will concentrate on issues 
owned by their party more consistently than Democratic state party 
platforms. 
I expect state party platforms to focus on issues their party owns and 
strategically frame any issues on which they trespass. At times, an opponent’s 
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advantage on an owned issue can be undermined with the use of strategic framing 
(Holian 2004; Sides 2006). Presidential candidate Bill Clinton used this strategy 
successfully in the 1992 presidential race, by reframing and focusing on a specific 
portion of the crime issue. Although Republicans generally are perceived as better 
qualified to handle law and order issues, Democrats often are perceived as better suited 
for dealing with crime prevention – an important subset of law and order. By framing 
the perceived crime problem in the United States as a failure to adequately address the 
sources of crime, Clinton was able to use a Republican-owned issue against his 
Republican opponent.  
In the end, how parties phrase policy positions in the platforms can be as 
important as the position taken. It appears that parties construct policy planks so as to 
reassure relevant interest groups and placate a variety of political leaders, activists, and 
partisan voters; groups and activists examine party platforms for references to their 
favored interests (Domke and Coe 2008). Language may be conciliatory in nature, but 
other times, parties may choose to take more aggressive policy stances. Although the 
parties are likely to agree on a variety of specific policy positions, they often choose 
dramatically different approaches that will be seen as attractive to distinctive sets of 
interest groups and individuals. As a result, parties are expected to take great care in 
how they address volatile issues and which words they choose. 
Measuring Issue Ownership Patterns in State Party Platforms 
The persuasiveness of issue ownership theory relies heavily on the validity of 
issue categorization. For the first test, the 56 policy categories are divided into four 
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classifications – Democratic owned issues, Republican owned issues, performance 
issues, and “other” issues. Table 12 shows how each policy is categorized. To determine 
what proportion of state party platforms address each category of issues, the number of 
coding units addressing Democratic owned issues are summed, then divided by the total 
number of coding units in that platform. This provides a simple measure of what 
percentage of a platform’s quasi-sentences address Democratic owned issues for each 
available state party platform. An identical measure is created for Republican owned 
issues, performance issues, and the “other” category. The results indicate, on average, 
what percentage of coding units in state party platforms address each category of 
issues.87 
Democratic Issue Focus = ∑ (Democratic Owned Issues) / ∑ (All Issues) 
Republican Issue Focus = ∑ (Republican Owned Issues) / ∑ (All Issues) 
Performance Issue Focus = ∑ (Performance Issues) / ∑ (All Issues) 
Other Issue Focus = ∑ (Other Issues) / ∑ (All Issues) 
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 The STATA do file for this chapter is available in Appendix D. The accompanying dataset is available 
from the author upon request. 
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Code Category Description Ownership Categorization 
Test 1 
Ownership 
Categorization 
Test 2 
DOMAIN 1: External Relations   
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive Performance Issue Performance Issue 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative Performance Issue Performance Issue 
103 Anti-Imperialism Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
104 Military: Positive Republican Owned Republican Owned 
105 Military: Negative Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
106 Peace Performance Issue Performance Issue 
107 Internationalism: Positive Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
109 Internationalism: Negative Republican Owned Republican Owned 
    
DOMAIN 2: Freedom and Democracy   
200 Libertarianism Republican Owned Republican Owned 
201 Freedom and Human Rights Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
202 Democracy Other - - - 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive Other - - - 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative Other - - - 
    
DOMAIN 3: Political System   
301 Federalism/States’ Rights Republican Owned Republican Owned 
302 Centralisation Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency Republican Owned Republican Owned 
304 Political Corruption Other - - - 
305 Political Authority Other - - - 
    
DOMAIN 4: Economy   
401 Free Market Economy Republican Owned Performance Issue 
402 Incentives Republican Owned Performance Issue 
403 Market Regulation Democrat Owned Performance Issue 
404 Economic Planning Performance Issue Performance Issue 
405 Corporatism/ Mixed Economy Performance Issue Performance Issue 
406 Protectionism: Positive Republican Owned Performance Issue 
407 Protectionism: Negative Democrat Owned Performance Issue 
408 Economic Goals Performance Issue Performance Issue 
409 Keynesian Demand Management Performance Issue Performance Issue 
410 Economic Growth Performance Issue Performance Issue 
411 Technology and Infrastructure Other Performance Issue 
412 Controlled Economy Democrat Owned Performance Issue 
413 Nationalisation Other Performance Issue 
414 Economic Orthodoxy Republican Owned Performance Issue 
415 Marxist Analysis  Other Performance Issue 
416 Sustainability Democrat Owned Performance Issue 
Table 12: Ownership Categorization of Policy Issues 
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(Continued) 
Code Category Description Ownership Categorization 
Test 1 
Ownership Categorization 
Test 2 
DOMAIN 5: Welfare and Quality of Life   
501 Environmental Protection Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
502 Culture Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
503 Equality Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
504 Welfare State: Positive Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
505 Welfare State: Negative Republican Owned Republican Owned 
506 Education Expansion Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
507 Education Limitation Republican Owned Republican Owned 
508 The Myth of Global Warming Republican Owned Republican Owned 
    
DOMAIN 6: Fabric of Society   
601 National Way of Life: Positive Other - - - 
602 National Way of Life: Negative Other - - - 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive Republican Owned Republican Owned 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
605 Law and Order Republican Owned Republican Owned 
606 Civic Mindedness Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive  Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative Republican Owned Republican Owned 
    
DOMAIN 7: Social Groups   
701 Labour Groups: Positive  Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
702 Labour Groups: Negative Republican Owned Republican Owned 
703 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups Democrat Owned Democrat Owned 
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups Other - - - 
Table 12: Ownership Categorization of Policy Issues 
Results 
Hypothesis 5.1 suggests that Democratic state party platforms will focus on 
Democrat owned issues significantly more than on issues owned by Republicans. The 
results are consistent with this expectation. More than 60 percent of policy statements 
in Democratic state party platforms address issues owned by the Democratic Party 
(Table 13). On average, only 11 percent of policy statements in Democratic state party 
platforms trespass onto issues owned by the Republican Party, and 5 percent address 
performance issues, including the economy.  
 
88 
Table 13: Issue Ownership in State Party Platforms 
Republican state party platforms follow a similar, but less forceful pattern. 
Approximately 52 percent of quasi-sentences in Republican state party platforms 
address Republican owned issues, compared to the 20 percent which address 
Democratic owned issues (Figure 13). Again, performance issues account for less than 
10 percent of all coding units in Republican state party platforms. These results lend 
credence to hypothesis 5.2; Republican state party platforms address Republican owned 
issues significantly more than Democratic owned issues.  
Figure 13: Issue Ownership in State Party Platforms 
  
 Democratic Platforms Republican Platforms 
 % of Coding Units % of Coding Units 
Democrat Owned 62% 20% 
Republican Owned 11% 52% 
Performance Issues 5% 7% 
Other Issues 23% 21% 
Total 100% 100% 
Note: Test 1 Results; includes issues in “other” category; economic issues split among categories. 
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The validity of coding is critically important to identifying patterns of issue 
ownership in state party platforms and it is necessary to demonstrate that bias is not 
playing a significant role in the results. If we simplify the issue ownership classification 
and use only three categories – Democratic owned issues, Republican owned issues, and 
performance issues, we can eliminate some of the possible uncertainty (Table 12). 
Issues that would normally be categorizes as “other,” meaning they did not neatly fall 
into party owned categories or as performance issues, are dropped from the analysis 
altogether. Furthermore, by categorizing all economic policy categories as performance 
issues, rather than distinguishing between liberal- and conservative-leaning positions, 
we can lend additional simplicity and further reduce the opportunity for bias. Only some 
of the economic issues examined in this analysis can be reliably linked to Democrats and 
Republicans by the existing literature. Separating economic issue categories introduces 
unnecessary validity concerns without adding substantial explanatory value to the 
results. While we may assume liberal positions should be attributed to Democratic 
ownership, this assumption cannot be adequately defended. Issue ownership is 
concerned with the party deemed most capable of handling distinct sets of issues, not 
how the issues are addressed. Thus, while free market principles may be a conservative 
notion, it is not an owned issue. This simplified ownership coding scheme is a more 
appropriate way to examine ownership patterns. Only issues which clearly fall into a 
party owned category or are clearly performance issues are examined.  
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Table 14: Issue Ownership in State Party Platforms, Simplified Categorization 
When this simplified categorization theme is applied to state party platforms, 
the numerical results change significantly, although the conclusions do not (Table 14). 
Using both categorization schemes, Democratic state party platforms demonstrate a 
distinct preference for Democratic owned issues, and Republicans state party platforms 
are noticeably partial to Republican owned issues (Figure 14). These results indicate 
clear support for hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2. When the simplified coding scheme is applied, 
the tendency of Democratic state party platforms to focus on issues their party owns 
intensifies. Nearly three-quarters of Democratic state party platforms are devoted to 
Democratic owned issues (Figure 14). Like their Democratic counterparts, Republican 
state party platforms emphasize performance issues and allocate nearly a third of their 
platforms to these leased issues. However, unlike the Democrats, Republican state party 
platforms devote a substantial portion of their contents to issues owned by their 
opponents.  
 Democratic Platforms Republican Platforms 
 % of Coding Units % of Coding Units 
Democrat Owned 71% 23% 
Republican Owned 9% 48% 
Performance Issues 20% 29% 
 100% 100% 
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Figure 14: Issue Ownership in State Party Platforms, Simplified Categorization 
While these results are encouraging, they are based upon the average attention 
dedicated to Democratic and Republican owned issues, and over-emphasis on averages 
can obscure important differences among the states. Figure 15 and Figure 16 display the 
proportion of state party platforms dedicated to party owned issues for each state. The 
averages support hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, but it is clear that state parties do not behave 
consistently with one another. The degree to which the parties diverge suggests 
significant differences in salience, focus, and political needs. 
The results in Figure 14 indicate support for hypothesis 5.3 as well. Performance 
issues (defined as any economic or foreign policy issue position) account for 20 and 29 
percent of Democratic and Republican state party platforms, respectively. As with nearly 
all issues, the degree to which state party platforms focus on performance issues varies 
significantly across state lines, as well as party (Figure 17). While party averages for 
performance issues are similar for Democrats and Republicans at the state level, the 
party banner hides some deviation. It is clear that performance issues account for no 
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more than 40 percent of any Democratic state party platform and account for a third of 
Democratic platforms in only four states.88 In contrast, performance issues appear, on 
average, 10 percent more often in Republican state party platforms and performance 
issues account for more than a third of platform issue content in 14 Republican state 
party platforms.89 The high salience of these issues in 2008-10, and the fact that they 
are not owned consistently by either party means that this focus on performance issues 
should not come as a surprise.90 In both 2008 and 2010 (and 2012, for that matter) 
economic issues rank as the most important issue to Americans (Gallup 2012). 
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 Performance issues account for 39 percent of the Alabama Democratic state party platform, 35 percent 
of the Michigan Democratic, and 33 percent of the New Hampshire and Connecticut Democratic 
platforms. 
89
 Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
90
 These results are consistent with previous work on 2008 presidential campaign advertisements where 
economic policy was a major area of focus (Foster-Shoaf 2010). 
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Figure 15: Proportion of State Party Platforms Dedicated to Democratic Owned Issues, by Party and State 
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Figure 16: Proportion of State Party Platforms Dedicated to Republican Owned Issues, by Party and State 
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Figure 17: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Performance Issues, by Party and State 
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Contrary to hypothesis 5.4, under both categorization schemes, Democratic state 
party platforms adhere to the expectations of issue ownership theory more stringently 
than Republican state party platforms. This finding, in particular, is interesting. At the 
national level, when examining candidate rhetoric and campaign advertisements, the 
Republican Party tends to conform to issue ownership expectations more rigidly than 
their Democratic counterparts. At the national level, Democrats are more likely to 
trespass onto Republican owned issue areas; when we look at state party platforms, this 
pattern is reversed.  
While this may be an artifact of the election covered by this analysis, it may be 
that the state and local interests are influencing state party platforms in a way that they 
do not in presidential or congressional elections. In addition to addressing issues of 
national concern (foreign policy, national security, Social Security, etc.), state party 
platforms also address local and regional concerns. Because state officials and 
state/local activists are often involved in the crafting of state party platforms, it would 
seem reasonable that state and local issues would be commonly addressed. In some 
ways, this might make it easier for Democrats to remain more consistently focused on 
Democrat-owned issues. Issues that are generally perceived as most salient in national 
elections are skewed towards Republican ownership, but the issues most relevant at the 
state level are often owned by the Democrats (Damore 2004). This variation in the 
saliency dynamics may help explain why at the national level Republicans are more 
consistent with issue ownership expectations, but at the state level Democrats are more 
consistent. 
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Explaining Ownership Patterns 
On average, 70 percent of Democratic state party platforms address Democratic 
owned issues and half of Republican state party platforms focus on Republican owned 
issues. These averages, however, mask significant variations across the states (Figure 
15;Figure 16). So, what factors account for the variations we see between the states? 
Table 15: Predicting the Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Owned Issues, by Party 
If we examine only Democratic state party platforms, we can see that platform 
ideology, platform length, and region all influence the proportion of Democratic state 
party platforms dedicated to Democratic owned issues (Table 15, models 1 and 2). The 
proportion of coding units dedicated to Democratic owned issues increases as 
Democratic state party platforms become more liberal and shorter. When state 
 Democratic State Party Platforms Republican State Party Platforms 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable Democratic Owned 
Proportion 
Democratic Owned 
Proportion 
Republican Owned 
Proportion 
Republican Owned 
Proportion 
Franzmann & Kaiser 
Ideology Scaled 
-.031 *** 
(.008) 
-.031 *** 
(.001) 
.051 *** 
(.010) 
.051 *** 
(.009) 
Coding Units -.001 ** 
(.000) 
-.001 ** 
(.000) 
.001 ** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
District 
Competitiveness 
-.000 
(.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
.003 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
Density -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.001 ** 
(.000) 
-.001 ** 
(.000) 
Confederate .013 
(.033) 
- - - -.005 
(.045) 
- - - 
 
RegionC .014 ** 
(.005) 
.013 ** 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.004 
(.007) 
Election Result .000 
(.001) 
- - - -.000 
(.002) 
- - - 
State Ideology - - - -.007 
(.110) 
- - - 0.008 
(.139) 
Constant .515 *** 
(.079) 
.540 ** 
(.178) 
.187 
(.128) 
0.159 
(.270) 
Adjusted R
2
 .423 .440 .641 .651 
N 37 37 43 43 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Democratic platform committees feel pressure (from either internal or external forces) 
to produce more concise platforms, it appears that they typically prioritize Democratic 
owned issues. Only when Democratic state party platforms become longer do they 
integrate significant proportions of Republican owned issues. Democratic state party 
platforms are also significantly more likely to address Democratic owned issues in the 
northeast and east north central census regions (Table 16). Interestingly, the political 
competitiveness of the state and the ideological bend of the state have no effect on 
Democrats’ decision to focus on owned issues. 
Table 16: Degree of Focus on Democratic Owned Issues in Democratic State Party Platforms by US Census Region 
When we look at Republican state party platforms in isolation, platform 
ideology, length, and state population density appear to influence the decision to focus 
on Republican owned issues (Table 15, models 3 and 4). As Republican state party 
platforms become more conservative and longer, the focus on Republican owned issue 
increases. While Democratic state party platforms trespass more frequently with 
increased length, Republican state party platforms do the reverse. As Republican state 
party platforms become longer, the extra space is filled with Republican owned issues. 
  Level of Focus on Democratic Owned Issues 
 Number High Medium Low 
New England 5 100% - - 
Mid-Atlantic 2 50% 50% - 
South Atlantic 4 25% 75% - 
East South Central 2 50% - 50% 
West South Central 3 - 100% - 
East North Central 3 67% - 33% 
West North Central 5 - 60% 40% 
Mountain 8 13% 37% 50% 
Pacific 5 20% - 80% 
Note: Pearson’s Chi-Squared = 33.14, p < .007 
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This suggests that Republican state party platform committees may feel pressure to 
address a certain core set of salient state issues owned by their opponents, despite 
inherent political disadvantages.  
Republican state party platforms are also more likely to address Republican 
owned issues in less densely populated states. Additional research is needed to 
determine if this pattern holds over time and to assess the full impact population 
density has on platform development. Unlike their Democratic counterparts, region 
does not appear to have any effect on ownership focus for Republican state party 
platforms. As with the Democratic results, the competitiveness of the state and the 
ideological bend of the state have no effect on Democrats’ decision to focus on owned 
issues. 
If we look at the Democratic and Republican state party platforms together, 
some interesting patterns emerge. As models 5 and 6 indicate, as state party platforms 
become more liberal, shorter, and the ideology of the state moves left, the focus on 
Democratic owned issues increases (Table 17). If we wanted to examine where the 
prevalence of Republican owned issues is higher, we ought to look for longer, 
conservative platforms in lower density states. Although elections results and state 
ideology measures help predict the incidence of Democrat owned issues, these 
measures offer no insight into the prevalence of Republican owned issues. 
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 All State Party Platforms 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable Democratic Owned Proportion Republican Owned Proportion 
Franzmann & Kaiser 
Ideology Scaled 
-.052 *** 
(.001) 
.044 *** 
(.002) 
Coding Units -.001 *** 
(.000) 
.001 ** 
(.000) 
District Competitiveness -.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Density .000 
(.000) 
-.001 ** 
(.000) 
RegionC .008 ** 
(.003) 
.004 
(.004) 
Election Result - - - - - - 
State Ideology -1.23 ** 
(.062) 
-.048 
(.085) 
Constant .678 *** 
(.111) 
.370 ** 
(.151) 
Adjusted R
2
 .946 .871 
N 80 80 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 17: Predicting the Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Owned Issues, Democrat and Republican 
Conclusion 
The sharp distinction between party behavior at the national level and the state 
level is critical for our understanding of the American party system. In contemporary 
politics, the Republican Party often finds itself the target of pointed criticism for the 
party’s intense focus on particular issue areas and the lack of regard shown to other 
areas of public policy. The perceived homogeneity of the Republican Party and their 
demonstrated narrow focus has caused some political observers to predict the 
approaching downfall of the Republican Party. With only two major national parties, 
each must operate a big tent coalition to survive and the Republican Party’s narrow 
focus and inflexibility make it appear vulnerable. However, these results suggest that 
the concern for the long-term viability of the Republican Party might be premature. 
Although the patterns of behavior of the national party may appear strategically 
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questionable, the state Republican parties are engaging in very different patterns of 
behavior. As such, the state parties and their independence might be the saving grace of 
national parties gone awry. More research is needed to ensure that the observed 
pattern is not an artifact of an election cycle which favored the Democratic Party, and to 
confirm that the national-level and state-level behavioral differences of the parties exist 
beyond platform content. However, these results provide specific, tangible evidence 
that party behavior differs at the national and state levels. 
  
102 
CHAPTER 6 
FIFTY STATES UNDER GOD: MORALITY POLITICS & STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
In the months leading up to the 2008 general election a series of events 
dramatically shifted the attention of Americans to the economy. In November 2008, 77 
percent of respondents identified economic issues as the nation’s most important 
problem and it was this focus that many argue gave the Democrats an edge (Newport 
2011). Concern for the economy has not diminished. In January 2008, 36 percent of 
Americans were satisfied with the state of the nation’s economy, compared to just 13 
percent four years later (Saad 2012). At the same time, the percentage of Americans 
who were satisfied with the moral and ethical climate of the United State fell to 28 
percent from 39 percent (Gallup 2012). Even when nearly three-quarters of Americans 
identify economic issues as the most important problems facing the nation, issues of 
morality often find a way into the public debate. While Americans insist economic issues 
are most critical in the current political climate, television, print, and online news 
sources suggests while Americans are concerned about the economy, they remain 
fixated on the politics of sex. Consider a few of the debates in the limelight in early 
2012: 
 While access to contraception was affirmed in 1965, a fresh debate over the 
use of birth control and the ability of government to mandate its coverage by 
insurance companies is raging now (Cohen 2012). The mandate is being 
attacked by religious leaders fearful that employers’ religious freedoms 
would be violated if insurance companies are required to provide 
contraception coverage in employee health insurance plans.   
 Virginia lawmakers recently considered a bill which would require women 
seeking to terminate a pregnancy to undergo an extremely invasive vaginal 
ultrasound procedure. Outcry over the proposed legislation, which became a 
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key talking point on late night television, and backtracking by the state’s 
conservative governor led to significant changes in the bill.  
 “Personhood” legislation, giving embryos full rights, is hot right now. 
Opponents argue such measures would restrict a women’s right to make 
their own healthcare decisions, while others are concerned about the 
possible implications of such measures on certain types of contraceptives 
(especially IUDs) and in-vitro fertilization.91 In recent months, legislatures in 
Virginia (Weinger 2012) and Oklahoma (Hoberock 2012), and Mississippi 
voters considered comparable amendments (Wagster 2011). 
 Gay rights advocates received new reasons to cheer – the Obama 
administration announced that it will no longer defend the controversial 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act in court (Rosenblatt 2012), a federal appeals 
court overturned proposition 8 in California (Hennessey 2012), legislatures in 
Washington (La Courte 2012), Maryland (Breitenbach 2012), and New 
Jersey92  – all in the month of February.  
What this sampling of events from the first 60 days of 2012 indicates is a 
significant concern for morality politics, even within a political environment where 
economic issues are paramount. It seems that even when Americans recognize the 
importance of economic issues, they remain hooked on morality politics. The United 
States also has a historical devotion to the separation of church and state, but both the 
basis of this notion and what it means in practice remain hotly debated. Some of the 
problems stem from the fact that Americans’ notions of what constitutes the proper 
role of religion in the public square depends heavily upon ones’ denomination and 
personal beliefs, the issue at hand, and the point in history in which we inquire. 
However, despite the delicacy of religion and morality discussions, the issues remain 
highly salient even when voter agree on the primacy of economic issues.93 
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 Pope Benedict XVI called on Catholic follower to reject “artificial procreation”, including in-vitro 
fertilization, calling such actions a form of arrogance (USA Today 2012).  
92
 Governor Chris Christie vetoed the New Jersey legislation (Popovici and Warner 2012).  
93
 When speaking of religions explicitness is imperative. For the purposes of this project, religion will be 
defines as : “A set of beliefs in a transcendent God,  grounded in an authoritative text, and expressed by a 
body of believers through the performance of certain rituals and adherence to a specific moral code”. 
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God in America 
History has shown with tragic consistency that too intimate a 
relationship between religion and politics can do irreparable damage to 
both- from the crusades of medieval times to the terrorism of modern 
times. Constant use of the God strategy by political leaders encourages 
just such a relationship…. Pairing religious doctrine with public policy 
encourages citizens to conclude that the US government’s actions are the 
will of God- or at least congruent with such wishes- and therefore beyond 
question.94 
The very early beginning of European colonization of North America was driven, 
in part, for a desire for religious freedom. Although these early settlers seeking religious 
freedom were not pursuing freedom from religion, they certainly rejected the 
imposition of others’ religious values upon them. Yet, our founding mythology of the 
birth of America as a Christian nation,95 under the auspices of our honorable founding 
fathers is just that – a myth. Grounded upon facts, but embellished for effect, our 
country has deep ties to faith, but not as either atheists or evangelicals would like to 
believe. 
Many of our founding fathers were men of faith, but they often pursued their 
faith in rather unconventional ways. Thomas Jefferson, for example, edited his own 
version of the Bible, and James Madison viewed his presidential proclamations 
recommending public days of prayer unfavorably later in life (Mooney 1990). Our 
                                                                                                                                                              
Similarly, clarity with regard to the definition of politics is also important. Here politics will mean “the 
process that establishes priorities, formulates policies, and allocates resources among competing 
interests” (Lambert 2008). 
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 Domke and Coe 2008, 140. 
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 Interestingly, calls to return to our Christian roots, back to the founders’ original devotion to 
Protestantism are nearly as old as the nation itself. In July 1827, Philadelphia minister Ezra Stiles Ely said, 
“We are a Christian nation: we ought to have a right to demand that all our rulers in their conduct shall 
conform to Christian morality; and if they do not, it is the duty and privilege of Christian freemen to make 
a new and better election” (Lambert 2008, 2). 
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founding fathers recognized the utility of religion in public life in promoting public 
virtue, but they also appreciated its potential for danger. They were not so far removed 
from “the religious strife that had plagued Europe for centuries- the very strife that had 
compelled their ancestors to seek religious freedom in a new world” (Domke and Coe 
2008, 140). Thus, the founders did not design a Christian nation where only one view of 
morality was to be accepted, nor did they create a godless empire with no room for 
religious faith. Perhaps more to the point, the American founding was not a morally 
pure endeavor – slavery was shielded96 and the equality of women dismissed (Feldman 
2006).Like most successful endeavors, varied and conflicting interests were balanced 
and no one walked away entirely satisfied. Contemporary observers have noted the 
disconnect between the American founding mythology and reality. Although coarse, 
author Jon Meacham sums up this contradiction succinctly,  
The right’s contention that we are a ‘Christian nation’ that has 
fallen from pure origins and can achieve redemption by some kind of 
return to Christian values is based upon wishful thinking, not convincing 
historical argument.97 
Despite the fact that our founding mythology overstates the  framers’ 
enthusiasm for religion in the public sphere, our modern addiction to morality politics is 
likely a consequence of our religious traditions. Religion plays an important practical 
role in American life helping to make up for a decreased sense of community and the 
need for stable social identity (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). Economic and social 
mobility undermines traditional social differentiation, physical mobility weakens 
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 For the longest time southern evangelicals supported slavery claiming Biblical support for the practice 
(Kohut et al. 2000). 
97
 Meacham 2007, 18. 
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traditional community ties, and immigration patterns produce waves of cultural change. 
In this environment, religion serves as a social anchor for many. This is as true today as it 
was when Tocqueville wrote of America, “The religious atmosphere of the country was 
the first thing that struck me on my arrival in the United States.” Even today, Americans 
are generally more religious than citizens of other western democracies despite a lack of 
any official religion. Survey research consistently finds that as per capita income of 
nations rises, religiosity diminishes, with one exception – the United States (Domke and 
Coe 2008). 
The consistent prominence of religion in America often obscures the fact that 
religion itself is not a static concept. While many of the world’s largest religions have 
been around for thousands of years, modern religions are not perfect reflections of their 
roots. Even something as infallible as a sacred text must be viewed with an eye on 
history. The way sacred texts are interpreted, or even what is included in sacred texts is 
known to change over time. The rituals practiced in furtherance of religion are even 
more susceptible to change (Eck 2001). This is critical because as religions change, so 
does the intersection of God and government. Consider, for example, that while modern 
politicians are often heard invoking the name of God in their speeches, this is not as 
traditional is it may seem. Richard Nixon was the first to end a presidential address with 
“God bless America” and historically most presidents refrained from invoking God in 
presidential addresses at all. Ronald Reagan introduced the modern trend of invoking 
God, and his successors in both parties have followed suit (Domke and Coe 2008). It is 
not to say that religion is a new topic in the political arena, or that attacks on politicians’ 
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faith are a modern phenomenon. One of the most personally nasty elections in 
American history took place in 1800 when one newspaper printed, “God- and a religious 
president or….Jefferson-and no God” (Meacham 2007, 104). 
Not only is a demonstration of faith important for political leaders, but those 
wishing to win public favor must consider the specifics of their professed faith. In the 
late 19th century objections to the inclusion of Catholics in the political process was 
common (Hamburger 2002). Concerns that Catholic citizens would align their political 
activities with the wishes of the Pope were widespread, and it was not until John F. 
Kennedy demonstrated his independence from the Catholic Church that this 
apprehension began to fade. Interestingly, for Kennedy, it was necessary to divorce his 
faith from his political self but today candidates need to exhibit their faith. In 2004, 
presidential hopeful John Kerry found it politically expedient to demonstrate his 
faithfulness to the Catholic Church, in spite of his being denied communion and refusal 
to denounce abortion rights (Domke and Coe 2008). While denomination is less 
politically important today than the perceived degree of religious faith, denominational 
differences still exist. In the 2012 Republican primary race, Mitt Romney had to field 
attacks that his Mormon faith is a “cult”. 
Faith beyond Ideology 
The use of religion to justify policy positions is as old as religion itself. Although 
our contemporary political environment leads us to perceive religious faith as a 
conservative feature, historically, both liberals and conservatives have fought to use 
God to push forth their pet policies. Religion has been used to call for an end to slavery, 
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for the advancement of the civil rights movement, to fight apartheid, to support anti-
war movements, to advocate for expanded suffrage rights, to support the temperance 
movement, and bolster Cold War fears over “Godless communism” (Domke and Coe 
2008; Wilcox and Robinson 2011). 
The language we use to discuss morality politics can influence our policy 
preferences. Social conservatives often use the language of “rights” in support of their 
conservative agenda. Rather than making the argument that the United States is a 
Christian nation, thus we all should adhere to Christian values (like prayer in public 
school, eschewing of evolutionary theory, etc.) the focus is put on the protection of 
rights for religious individuals. They speak of the right of children to practice their 
religion via prayer, the rights of the unborn, and the rights of parents to raise their 
children as they see fit (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). They argue that the secular 
movement is trampling the rights of the faithful and argue that they are simply acting in 
self-defense against liberalizing social change. 
Why Morality Politics? 
In my pursuit of a better understanding of the American party system and state 
political parties, I have chosen to focus on a subset of policies known as morality 
politics. Morality policies are those based upon core principles on which everyone is 
able to form an opinion, with little need for technical expertise (Mooney 2001). These 
policies focus on the policy issues tied most closely with personal values or religion. 
Abortion, same-sex marriage, divorce, euthanasia, school prayer, drug policy, etc. all fall 
into the category of morality politics.  
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I chose to focus my attention on morality politics for several reasons. First, 
morality policies are inherently interesting. They deal with fundamental issues of right 
and wrong, with fairness and equality, and with our notions of what constitutes the 
“right” way to live. These policies help dictate some of the most personal aspects of our 
lives – our childbearing decisions, our sexual relationships, our religious lives, our 
consciences, and our deaths. 
The technical simplicity of morality politics makes morality politics easy for lay 
persons to understand the basics of the issues, even if some nuances elude them. I 
could have chosen to focus on economic policy. This policy area is certainly a popular 
topic now, although the intricacies of economic policy require a greater policy 
understanding and familiarization with economic theory. For example, should the 
United States tax capital gains at the same rate as work income? Understanding what 
impact such a policy shift might make requires a far more sophisticated understanding 
of economic policy than a decision of whether or not to ensure formal government 
recognition of same-sex couples. While certainly important, economic policy is more 
complicated and lacks the spark provided by morality politics. 
Social welfare policy would also make a fine area of study. Policy positions 
related to food stamps, welfare, public education, Medicaid, Social Security, and the like 
account for a large portion of state and federal budgets. In these tight fiscal times, these 
programs are increasingly faced with budget shortfalls and drastic cuts. These policies 
have a direct impact on citizens’ lives – vaccination programs for toddlers, public 
education for children, Medicaid for the impoverished, Medicare and Social Security for 
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the elderly. However, like economic policy, welfare policy discussions require a 
significant base of technical understanding. To discuss social welfare policy, one ought 
to be familiar with what these policies do – and which level of government dictates and 
implements policy, as well as understand the economic consequences of policy 
alternatives. A thorough discussion of social welfare policy in state party platforms 
would be an excellent area to expand at a later date. 
Finally, like social welfare and education policy, morality policy battles are often 
fought most intensely at the state level. Although social conservatives have had 
moderate success at putting members in Congress and frequently are active in 
presidential politics, they often feel as though their efforts at changing national policy 
have produced inadequate results. The GOP has actively sought to frame issues as 
morality policies, and they have seen some success in evoking a sense of patriotism to 
garner support for conservative policies, particularly at the state level. Many social 
conservatives, especially those associated with the Christian right have begun shifting 
their focus on state-level political change. It is generally easier to change state policy 
than national policy, especially in states where there are provisions for initiatives and 
referendums (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). States regulate many of the policy areas 
dearest to the movement, including school curriculum, restrictions on abortion access, 
defining marriage,. and these issues have repeatedly shown up on ballots for a public 
vote. When morality issues make it onto the ballot via initiatives and referendums, the 
outcomes typically favor conservatives (NCSL 2010). 
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Understanding Morality Politics 
Because morality policies are technically simple, highly salient, and tied closely to 
core values and understandings of right and wrong, public debates on morality policies 
are often heated and leave little room for compromise. Unlike economic policies where 
compromise can simply mean an agreement to split the difference, compromise on 
morality politics is more complicated. Consider the following example related to the 
long-standing abortion debate in the United States. Although the policy stances 
discussed below are simplified for the sake of clarity, the case should help illustrate the 
difficulty in compromise with regard to morality politics. Consider that for those who 
maintain the strict belief that human life begins at the moment of conception, any 
attempt to prevent pregnancy by preventing the implanting of the fertilized egg or any 
effort to terminate an existing pregnancy may be seen as tantamount to murder. 
Working under this belief, what might a compromise regarding contraception and 
abortion laws look like? Those with more moderate views may be able to consider 
limiting the availability of abortions to the first trimester or an increased focus on 
reducing the incidence of unwanted pregnancies as an indirect way to limit the demand 
for abortions an acceptable compromise, but those whose values reflect the 
aforementioned strict interpretation of life may find such policies intolerable. 
Whether or not a set of beliefs are accurate or reasonable is not immediately 
pertinent to the issue at hand. It is the simple fact that the beliefs are deeply held that 
makes them of great consequence. Science can distinguish between preventing 
pregnancy and terminating pregnancy, but has proven unable to conclusively determine 
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when life begins (whether at fertilization, implantation, the development of a heartbeat, 
or at viability), much less what the relative value of life means. Other morality policies 
follow a similar pattern where definitions are often based upon beliefs and values, 
rather than demonstrable facts, opening the door for intense debate. 
Although issues of morality have been salient in society and politics for as long as 
society has existed, and certainly since the American founding, inclusion of morality 
policies in national party platforms is relatively new. While issues of morality have 
always played a central role in American politics – consider slavery and civil rights, 
women’s suffrage and role in society - until the 1970s there was almost no discussion of 
morality politics in national platforms (Domke and Coe 2008). This has changed and 
morality politics are routinely addressed in national and state party platforms by both 
Democrats and Republicans. How morality politics are addressed and the level of 
attention morality issues receive varies, but we can no longer say they are ignored. 
Republicans and the Religion Right  
The Republican Party has found significant success in courting the religious right 
and the division between frequent and occasional churchgoers is a modern realignment 
(Layman 2001; Putnam and Campbell 2010). The political strength gained by the GOP 
from their courting of the religious right is not absolute and it is often difficult to assess 
religious devotion in political leaders – their faith is strategically framed like any other 
personal characteristic (Green 2007; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2003; Monson and 
Oliphant 2007). While the religious right pulled serious weight in the 2004 presidential 
election, drawing in large sums of contributions and spurring turnout, some 
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conservative Christian commentators were unsatisfied with the GOP presidential 
candidates in 2004 and 2008. In 2008, not only did observers on the right question 
McCain’s conservative credentials, but McCain himself was less comfortable soliciting 
the support of the most conservative Christian leaders. The Democrats are no strangers 
to the power of faith, but again, it is not always easy to assess devotion and sincerity. 
Despite being a devout Christian, Jimmy Carter did not mention God in his 1980 
nomination speech; Bill Clinton invoked God in his 1992 nomination speech, despite 
past and future moral controversies (Domke and Coe 2008). It can be difficult to argue 
for policy positions contrary to religious teachings, particularly when seeking the 
support of the devout. Given Americans’ relative devotion to religion, it might seem 
surprising that the religious right has not been more successful at changing public policy. 
This is attributable, in part, to the small, but ardent libertarian wing of the Republican 
Party for resisting GOP effort to overregulate individual behavior. Social conservatives 
are also occasionally divided amongst themselves. Some oppose the targeting 
mobilization of religious voters, objecting to the politicization of religion – either feeling 
that religion should not play center stage in politics or feeling that when religion 
becomes too politicized, it becomes vulnerable to political manipulation. We can also 
thank the religious right themselves for occasionally shooting themselves in the foot by 
going too far for the comfort level of most Americans – devout as they are.  
While religion can serve important spiritual and practical purposes, sometimes 
the nobility of religion is lost in practice. The preference for tradition and the status quo 
in society occasionally results in abhorrent policy positions. Sometimes these failings are 
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the result of hypocrisy, but many times it is the result of people manipulating religion to 
cover personal biases. Occasionally catastrophic events like natural disasters can also 
bring out a darker side of religious leaders. In 2005 Reverend Pat Robertson suggested a 
link between the tragedies in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to the issue of abortion 
rights, and shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, televangelist Jerry 
Falwell spoke to his television audience, 
I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the 
feminists, and the gays and lesbians who are actively trying to make that 
an alternative lifestyle, the ALCU, People for the American way, all of 
them who have tried to secularize America. I point the finger at them and 
say, ‘You helped this happen’.98 
Other times, political leaders allow their personal religious beliefs to steer public 
policy decisions. In the early 1990’s politicians blocked the release of an AIDS pamphlet 
designed to help teenagers protect themselves from infection because the document 
advocated the use of condoms (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). The degree to which 
religion ought to influence public policy remain controversial. It is clear, however, that 
religion remains a powerful force in American politics. 
Expectations for Morality Politics in State Party Platforms 
Protecting public morality is an issue typically perceived as being owned by 
Republicans (Petrocik 1996). As such, we should expect Republican state party platforms 
to address issues of morality politics more frequently than their Democratic 
counterparts. Simply identifying which parties address morality policies is not enough. 
Within the broad category of morality politics, we have two distinct policy tracks – 
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conservative and progressive. In order to understand what mentions of morality politics 
mean, we must look at whether the policy mentions are supportive of conservative 
positions – anti-same-sex marriage, pro-life, or whether the positions are progressive – 
pro-same-sex marriage, pro-choice, Given the ideological leanings of state party 
platforms covered in chapter 4, I expect Republican platforms to include mostly 
conservative morality policy preferences and Democratic state party platforms to 
include mostly progressive morality policy preferences.  
 Hypothesis 6.1: Republican state party platforms will address morality issues 
significantly more than Democratic state party platforms. 
 Hypothesis 6.2: Mentions of morality politics in Republican state party 
platforms will emphasize traditional, conservative positions, while mentions 
of morality politics in Democratic state party platforms will emphasize 
progressive, liberal positions.  
As with platform ideology, the political environment of the state is expected to 
influence the morality politics content of state party platforms. Because moral issues are 
often more salient to those who perceive a threat, I expect platforms from conservative 
states to focus more on morality politics than platforms from liberal states, regardless of 
party. 
 Hypothesis 6.3: Platforms from conservative states will focus more on 
morality politics than in liberal states, in both parties. 
Because parties need to avoid alienating major segments of state populations in 
order to win elections, state parties are expected to behave strategically. In more 
conservative states, platforms are expected to embrace fewer liberal morality politics 
positions, regardless of party. In more liberal states, platforms of both parties are 
expected to include fewer conservative morality politics positions.  
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 Hypothesis 6.4: Platforms from conservative states will be less likely to 
include progressive morality politics mention than platforms from liberal 
states, regardless of party. 
 Hypothesis 6.5: Platforms from liberal state will be less likely to include 
traditional morality positions than platforms from conservative states, 
regardless of party. 
State ideology is not the only environmental factor expected to influence the 
treatment of morality politics in state party platforms. The political competitiveness of 
the state is also expected to have an impact. In more competitive states, platforms are 
expected to address morality politics more frequently than in less competitive states. 
Moreover, the difference between conservative and progressive morality politics 
mentions is expected to be smaller in more competitive states. 
I anticipate that party platforms in more competitive states will focus on 
morality politics more than platforms in less competitive environments. Morality politics 
are highly salient and in competitive environments it is politically difficult to simply 
avoid discussing the issues voters care about. In less competitive states political 
environments, state parties may feel that they have more discretion regarding the 
issues they must address and those they can disregard. 
 Hypothesis 6.6: Platforms from competitive states will address morality 
politics more frequently than platforms from less competitive states.  
While I expect the high salience of morality politics to drive an increase in 
mentions in more competitive states, I anticipate state party platforms in more 
competitive states to moderate their positions. In competitive states, I anticipate a 
smaller difference between traditional and progressive policy stances. In practice this 
pattern may emerge from party attempts to support a morality politics position, while 
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acknowledging and professing respect for those who may feel differently. In less 
competitive states, I expect this is less need to hedge on these delicate policy positions. 
 Hypothesis 6.7: The difference between conservative and progressive 
morality politics mentions will be smaller in more competitive states. 
Results 
 Hypothesis 6.1 suggests that Republican state party platforms will address 
morality issues significantly more than Democratic state party platforms and the results 
support this expectation. On average, Democratic state party platforms dedicate less 
than four percent of coding units to issues of morality politics compared to the more 
than 10 percent of the average Republican state party platforms (Figure 18). In only 6 
cases do states’ Democratic platforms address morality issues more frequently than the 
states’ Republican platforms – Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wyoming.  
To get a better handle on the partisan differences, I ranked the state party 
platforms by the percentage of the platforms’ coding units dedicated to morality 
politics. I then separated the platforms into three equal groups representing high, 
medium, and low morality policy focus. Examining morality policy focus in this manner, 
the partisan differences are more evident. More than half of Republican state party 
platforms fall into the highest morality politics concentration, while a majority of 
Democratic state party platforms fall into the lowest category of morality politic 
mentions (Table 18). These results clearly demonstrate that state Republican Party 
platforms are significantly more likely to address religious or moral issues.  
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More than 40 percent of Democratic state platforms dedicate less than three 
percent of their content to morality politics, compared to less than 20 percent of 
Republican state party platforms (Figure 18). These results support hypothesis 6.1, 
which suggested that Republican state party platforms would address morality policies  
Table 18: Percent of State Party Platforms and Degree of Focus on Morality Politics, by Party 
  
 Democrat Republican 
Low MP 51% (19) 19% (8) 
Medium MP 41% (15) 28% (12) 
High MP 8% (3) 53% (23) 
Total 100% (37) 100% (43) 
Chi-Squared = 19.86, p < .000 
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Figure 18: Percent of State Party Platforms Devoted to Morality Politics, by Party  
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more frequently than Democratic state party platforms. This may be because issues of 
morality and religion are generally perceived to be owned by Republicans. It may also be 
a reflection of it being more politically advantageous to champion traditional values. 
Hypothesis 6.2 predicts that mentions of morality politics in Republican state 
party platforms would emphasize traditional, conservative positions, while mentions of 
morality politics in Democratic state party platforms would emphasize progressive, 
liberal positions. The results support these expectations. Not only do Republican state 
party platforms dedicate an average of two and a half times the proportion of coding 
units to morality politics that Democratic state parties do, but Republicans focus 
overwhelmingly on traditional, conservative moral value positions (Figure 19). 
  
121 
 
Figure 19: Proportion of State Party Platforms Devoted to Traditional Morality Politics, by Party and State 
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More than 98 percent of all Republican state party platform mentions of 
morality policy are conservative positions (Table 19). Democratic state party platforms 
demonstrate a similar, but slightly softer pattern. Mentions of morality policies in 
Democratic state party platforms are in support of progressive policies in 91 percent of 
cases. 
Table 19: Percent of Coding Units in State Party Platforms Devoted to Morality Politics, by Party 
Party is not the only variable expected to influence the morality politics content 
of state party platforms. Hypothesis 6.3 suggests that party platforms developed in 
more conservative states will focus on morality politics more frequently than platforms 
developed in more liberal states, for both Democratic and Republican state parties. As 
Table 20 indicates, the ideological positioning of the state does not appear to influence 
the degree to which state party platforms focus on morality politics. Model 1 backs up 
these findings (Table 21). When controlling for party, state ideology has no effect on the 
percent of state party platforms dedicated to morality politics. 
Consistent with hypothesis 6.4, the proportion of state party platforms 
dedicated to progressive morality policy positions increases as states become more 
liberal, even when partisanship is accounted for (Table 21, model 2). This means that 
progressive morality policy mentions are more frequent in Democratic state party 
platforms than in Republican state party platforms, and more common in liberal state 
than in more conservative states. While these results may seem intuitive, they are 
 Democratic Republican All 
Traditional (603) 0.34% 10.15% 5.61% 
Progressive (604) 3.55% 0.17% 1.73% 
All Morality Politics 
(603+604) 
3.89 % 10.32% 7.35% 
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important because they suggest that the state political environment significantly 
influences the content of state party platforms. Because state political environments 
vary dramatically from each other and from national conditions, these findings 
demonstrate how state parties actively position themselves independent of national 
party influences. 
Democrat and Republican State Party Platforms 
 State Ideology 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Low MP 30% (7) 34% (10) 36% (10) 
Medium MP 35% (8) 45% (13) 21% (6) 
High MP 35% (8) 21% (6) 43% (12) 
Total 100% (23) 100% (29) 100% (28) 
Chi-Squared = 4.64, p < .326 
 
Democratic State Party Platforms 
 State Ideology 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Low MP 40% (4) 50% (7) 62% (8) 
Medium MP 40% (4) 50% (7) 31% (4) 
High MP 20% (2) 0% (0) 8% (1) 
Total 100% (10) 100% (14) 100% (12) 
Chi-Squared = 4.02, p < .404 
 
Republican State Party Platforms 
 State Ideology 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Low MP 23% (3) 20% (3) 13% (2) 
Medium MP 31% (4) 40% (6) 13% (2) 
High MP 46% (6) 40% (6) 73% (11) 
Total 100% (13) 100% (15) 100% (15) 
Chi-Squared = 4.09, p < .394 
Table 20: State Ideology and State Party Platform Focus on Morality Politics 
Hypothesis 6.5 suggests that platforms from liberal states will be less likely to 
include traditional morality positions than platforms from conservative states, 
regardless of party. Not only are references to traditional morality policy positions more 
common in Republican platforms, model 3 indicates that the proportion of state party 
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platforms dedicated to traditional morality positions is likely to increase as states 
become more conservative, even when controlling for party (Table 21). While state 
ideology does not appear to significantly influence the attention paid to morality politics 
in general, state ideology does appear to contribute to what types of morality politics 
are addressed by state party platforms. As models 2 and 3 indicate, state ideology is a 
highly significant predictor of the proportion of state party platforms dedicated to both 
traditional and progressive morality positions, even when party is controlled for. Even 
when controlling for partisanship, parties in more liberal states dedicate larger 
percentages of their platforms to progressive morality positions. Similarly, as states 
become more conservative, state party platforms are more likely to devote larger 
proportions of their policy statements to traditional morality positions, even when party 
is controlled for. 
Hypotheses 6.6 and 6.7 suggest that the political competitiveness of a state will 
encourage state parties to dedicate a larger percentage of their platforms to morality 
politics, and that the difference in focus on traditional versus progressive morality 
positions will be smaller in more competitive states. Using a stripped down model, the 
results provide no support for hypothesis 6.6 or 6.7. The political competitiveness of the 
state does not appear to have any effect on the amount of attention state parties pay to 
morality policies (Table 21, model 4). Even when we examine fully specified models, we 
can see that partisanship is the primary drive behind the proportion of state party 
platforms dedicated to morality policies (Table 21, model 6). Republican state party 
platforms tend to devote larger proportions of their platforms to morality politics than 
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their Democratic counterparts. While the number of coding units is statistically 
significant, the coefficient is negligible. 
Fortunately, I have had better luck identifying the variables that explain relative 
focus on traditional versus progressive morality policy positions. Using the simplest of 
models, contrary to hypothesis 6.7, the political competitiveness of a state does not 
appear to have any effect on the relative focus between traditional and progressive 
morality policy positions (Table 21, model 5). However, when we examine a fully 
specified model, we can see that partisanship, state ideology and platform length are all 
statistically significant (Table 21, model 7). As states become more conservative, they 
are more likely to shift their focus to traditional morality policy, and, as expected, state 
Republican Parties are more likely to focus more heavily on traditional morality 
positions than progressive morality policy. While the effect is modest, as state party 
platforms become longer, they are more like to emphasize traditional morality over 
progressive morality positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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DV: Percent of 
Platforms 
Dedicated to 
Morality Politics 
Percent of 
Platforms 
Dedicated to 
Progressive 
Morality 
Positions 
Percent of 
Platforms 
Dedicated to 
Traditional 
Morality 
Positions 
Percent of 
Platforms 
Dedicated to 
Morality Politics 
Difference 
between 
Traditional and 
Progressive 
Morality Politics 
Mentions 
Percent of 
Platforms 
Dedicated to 
Morality 
Politics 
Difference between 
Traditional and 
Progressive Morality 
Politics Mentions 
State Ideology -5.88 
(4.83) 
4.15 ** 
(1.74) 
-10.02 ** 
(4.32) 
  -1.72 
(5.49) 
-12.45 ** 
(5.06) 
Party -6.42 *** 
(1.21) 
3.38 *** 
(0.43) 
-9.80 *** 
(1.08) 
-6.22 *** 
(1.27) 
-13.15 *** 
(1.24) 
-6.86 *** 
(1.28) 
-13.84 *** 
(1.18) 
District 
Competitiveness 
   0.03 
(0.055) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Population Density      -0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Coding Units      0.00 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 ** 
(.003) 
Region C      -0.15 
(0.27) 
-0.11 
(0.25) 
        
Constant 21.09 ** 
(8.90) 
-7.43 ** 
(3.20) 
28.52 *** 
(7.95) 
9.02 *** 
(2.47) 
9.75 *** 
(2.41) 
13.84 
(9.89) 
33.17 *** 
(9.12) 
Adjusted R
2
 .260 .448 .521 .249 .606 .273 .659 
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01      
Table 21: Predicting Patterns of Morality Politics in State Party Platforms 
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 Model 4 was also run substituting Ranney’s folded measure of state political competitiveness. The results did not change. 
100
 Model 5 was also run substituting Ranney’s folded measure of state political competitiveness. When Ranney’s index was used, state political 
competitiveness reaches statistical significance (p < .05). 
101
 Model 6 was also run substituting Ranney’s folded measure of state political competitiveness. The results did not change. 
102
 Model 7 was also run substituting Ranney’s folded measure of state political competitiveness. The results did not change. 
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Discussion 
Examining the 80 state party platforms together, the rate of morality policy 
references is fairly even distributed across the scale. However, when party, state 
ideology, and state political competitiveness are taken into account, clearer patterns 
emerge. Republican state parties in more conservative states tend to dedicate larger 
proportions of their platforms to morality politics- particularly traditional morality 
positions. When Democratic state party platforms address morality politics, they tend to 
devote larger portions of their platforms to progressive morality positions, especially in 
states with more liberal state ideologies. If we look at the balance of morality politics 
between traditional and progressive positions, partisanship and state ideology are the 
driving forces. Interestingly, contrary to expectations, the political competitiveness of 
the state does not appear to have any effect on either the attention given to morality 
policies generally, or the relative focus on traditional versus progressive policies. 
Although these findings help us better understand how a state’s political 
environment may influence the content of state party platforms, a purely numerical 
discussion ignores more nuanced differences that are difficult to quantify. Just as the 
wording and style of platforms influence their length, style and language choices 
significantly shape their content. Only by carefully reviewing the full text of state party 
platforms do we see some of these patterns. Sometimes what is most interesting is not 
which issues are addressed, but how the issues are spoken of. For example the national 
Democratic Party platform takes a clear position on abortion rights, while declaring 
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support for programs that would reduce unwanted pregnancies and make it easier for 
women to raise children:  
The Democratic Party strongly and unequivocally supports Roe v. 
Wade and a woman’s right to choose a safe and legal abortion, 
regardless of ability to pay, and we oppose any and all efforts to weaken 
or undermine that right. The Democratic Party also strongly supports 
access to comprehensive affordable family planning services and age-
appropriate sex education which empower people to make informed 
choices and live healthy lives. We also recognize that such health care and 
education help reduce the number of unintended pregnancies and thereby 
also reduce the need for abortions. The Democratic Party also strongly 
supports a woman’s decision to have a child by ensuring access to and 
availability of programs for pre- and post-natal health care, parenting 
skills, income support, and caring adoption programs. 
The states vary significantly on how they address the abortion issue, even within 
the Democratic Party. California Democrats opt for a strong, unambiguous position: 
…Preserve confidential, unrestricted access to affordable, high 
quality, culturally sensitive health care services, including the full range of 
reproductive services, contraception and abortion, without requiring 
guardian, judicial, parental, or spousal consent or notification.103 
Democrats in Nebraska take a more cautious approach to abortion rights, 
We support the continuation of Title X funding for family 
planning….  the right of patients who rely on federally funded services to 
receive comprehensive medical information in order to make informed 
decisions regarding their medical treatment.104 
Hawaii Democrats opt for a less-is-more approach, “We support equal access to 
fundamental rights including but not limited to marriage, privacy, and a woman’s right 
to choose.”105 
                                                     
103
 2010 California State Democratic Platform. 
104
 2010 Nebraska State Democratic Platform. 
105
 2010 Hawaii State Democratic Platform. 
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Michigan Democrats seek to walk the line between supporting a core pillar of 
contemporary liberalism, and not ostracizing fellow partisans who hold a more 
conservative position, producing a platform that tip toes around a hot button issue:  
We believe that women should have access to reproductive 
medical services and professional advice when they need it. We pledge 
our support for reproductive freedom, giving a woman the right to make 
her own choices in this matter. But we respect the individual conscience of 
each American on this difficult issue. We strongly support family planning, 
child care, and adoption programs such as those in Governor Granholm’s 
pregnancy reduction initiative.106 
The examples above highlight the variations seen in Democratic state party 
platforms regarding abortion, although Republican state party platforms also contain 
some variation on this issue. In the case of Republican state party platforms, the 
variation is more limited and the degree to which the states parties vary is more a case 
of emphasis, rather than policy. Some Republican state party platforms do not address 
the issue at all, while others provide only a simple statement declaring their belief in 
“life begins at conception.” When Republican state party platforms discuss abortion in 
any length, the positions are unanimously staunchly conservative: 
Recognizing that abortion is grievously harmful to women, men, 
families, and society at large, as well as fatal to the unborn child, we 
support and strongly encourage positive alternatives to abortion, such as 
adoption.107 
Action should be taken leading to legislative guarantees and 
protection of the father’s inalienable right to decide against any unilateral 
or preemptive decision to terminate his child’s developing life.108 
                                                     
106
 2010 Michigan State Democratic Platform. 
107
 2008 Louisiana State Republican Platform. 
108
 2010 Minnesota State Republican Platform. 
 
 
127 
 
In general, when state Democratic platforms include support for traditional 
moral and religious norms, they generally opted to do so in very vague terms. Rather 
than indicating specific positions on morality issues or religious matters, Democratic 
platforms opted for broad supportive statements, “While partisan rhetoric seeks to 
separate, we Democrats believe strongly in our faith and are guided by our values”109 
and “(We) recognize the unique historic role faith has played in our community 
development and heritage. We recognize the importance that faith continues to play in 
the lives of Utah Democrats and all Utahns.”110 In addition, while support for traditional 
moral and traditional religious policies are scarce in state Democratic platforms, this 
rarity does not indicate a radically liberal position on sensitive social issues. In fact, state 
parties frequently avoid taking official stands on many morality issues. 
Conclusion 
Despite the emphasis on separation and individualism, the American psyche is 
deeply engrained with the idea that the US is a nation favored by God. This serves as a 
founding mythology, but often leads to a sense of self-righteousness (Domke and Coe 
2008). Government has the capacity to harm religion and individual freedom; however, 
the danger of religious entrenchment in the public sphere is that it is difficult to argue 
with the notion of an omnipotent and infallible God. It is not just the religious minorities 
and secularists who must take heed of the perils of faith in public policy, but also those 
of majority faith (Ward and Calhoun-Brown 2007). If we are to implement God’s 
                                                     
109
 2010 Virginia State Democratic Platform. 
110
 2010 Utah State Democratic Platform. 
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message as law, which interpretation shall we abide by – Catholic or Protestant, 
Methodist or Southern Baptist? Moreover, “If religion can take center stage in politics, 
what is keeping politics out of religion?” (Heschel 2004, 122) 
It is too easy to paint all Christians, all evangelicals, all persons of faith with one 
brushstroke. To insinuate that all evangelicals hold consistent public policy beliefs, much 
less all Christians, is disingenuous and inaccurate. Religion and public policy is a delicate 
equilibrium today, just as it was 200 years ago. We must find a way to balance the 
religious freedoms of some with the beliefs of others. That individuals’ sense of morality 
varies even among those who share a common faith makes government enforcement of 
virtue more contentious. 
It is a delicate balance we seek to strike between conflicting sets of values. As an 
elegant solution is unlikely to present itself, we are left to muddle through. State party 
platforms highlight how this struggle plays out in state parties as divergent interests 
fight to represent their values as those of the parties’. What we see in the end is a 
compromise that is frequently at odds with substantial portions of the state party, the 
state parties of their neighbors, as well as their national counterparts. 
While it is unclear how we might best achieve a virtuous society, this 
examination of state party platforms produces several unambiguous lessons. Despite 
conditions that prioritize economic issues, morality politics remain highly salient in 
American politics. The high salience and technical simplicity of morality politics drives 
public fascination with morality politics, it is important to recognize that these issues are 
also deeply personal. They deal with issues of marriage and sexuality, faith and personal 
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autonomy. Morality politics, in some respects, is society’s way of legislating a 
perspective of virtue and history suggests that no degree of economic turbulence or 
foreign policy entanglements will diminish the significance of these issues. 
Partisanship in the United States is a messy affair. While we are engrossed in the 
national spectacle, real action and meaningful variation exists in the states. Oklahoma 
Republicans and Massachusetts Republicans produce platforms that could easily be 
mistaken for opposing parties. While the national Republican Platform speaks bluntly 
about morality politics and presents robust conservative positions, Massachusetts 
Republicans take a more balanced approach. 
While the national party platforms are the documents that receive the most 
public attention when they are released during the presidential nominating conventions 
every four years, state parties across the country draft and revise state party platform 
every 2-4 years. The documents produced by the state parties are not flawless 
reflections of the national party platforms. The common perception of Democrats and 
Republicans as soldiers of the national parties is inaccurate and misleading. To speak of 
the Democratic and Republican parties as homogeneous ignores the vast degrees of 
dissimilarity visible in the state party platforms. We do not have two national political 
parties headquartered in DC, but 102 parties scattered across the county with every 
immeasurable degree of variation. Parties vary ideologically, in professionalism, in 
activity, and their treatment of morality politics. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Decentralization constitutes the most important single fact 
concerning the American parties. He who understands this fact, and 
knows nothing else, knows more about American parties than he who 
knows everything except this fact.111 
Review of Findings 
Chapter 4 
In some respects, state party platforms look exactly as we would expect them to. 
Unsurprisingly, Democratic state party platforms are longer and more liberal than 
Republican state party platforms. The conservative preference for smaller government 
does appear to translate frequently into briefer state party platforms, although this 
tendency should not be overstated. The Republican state party platform from Texas is a 
perfect counter example. Although Texas Republicans are big advocates for smaller 
government, decentralization, and individual liberty, their platform was the fifth longest 
out of all 80 in this sample. 
As expected, Democratic state party platforms are more liberal than their 
Republican counterparts. More interestingly, state parties in liberal states tend to 
position their platforms further left on the ideological spectrum than parties in more 
conservative states. This finding holds for both Democratic and Republican state parties. 
In more liberal states, both the state Democratic and the state Republican parties 
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produce more liberal platforms than parties in more conservative states. The political 
ideology of the state influences the state parties and the distribution and the median 
voter varies across states. This finding underscores the variation in the behavior and 
policy preferences of state parties, as well as the impact of local political conditions 
which serve to distance state parties from their national brethren.  
Not all of my predictions were supported. Contrary to expectations, there is 
more ideological variation in Republican state party platforms than Democratic state 
party platforms. I expected Democratic state party platforms to produce a greater 
ideological variety of platforms, given their diverse constituencies and the general 
populations’ distaste of the liberal label. The diversity seen in state Republican parties 
may help us understand how Republicans are able to win control of a majority of state 
legislatures and gubernatorial positions in spite of the national party’s increasingly 
narrow constituencies. While the national Republican Party becomes more 
homogeneous, more rigid, the state Republican parties are more flexible and responsive 
to the state political environment.  
Furthermore, the political competitiveness of the state does not appear to 
influence how closely state party platforms align ideologically with their national 
counterparts. I anticipated state party platforms in politically competitive states to 
parallel national party platforms. The political competitiveness of a state may influence 
other elements of state party behavior, but the ideology of state party platforms or their 
ideological distance from the national party does not appear to be effected. It may be 
that alignment with national parties which are not particularly popular may not help 
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parties succeed at the state level. When national parties, and national leaders, are 
viewed as out of touch, they may be more of a liability in state races. It may also be that 
the state parties do not approach platform writing with any intent to use their position 
relative to the national party in any strategic way. State party platforms may simply be 
drafted to reflect the dominant views of state party members, regardless of national 
patterns. That national and state platforms frequently align may simply be an artifact of 
shared interests, rather than any strategic development. 
Chapter 5 
Consistent with issue ownership theory, Democratic state party platforms 
emphasize Democratic owned issues, and focus less on Republican owned issues. 
Republican state party platforms behave similarly, preferring to focus on issues owned 
by Republicans more frequently than issues owned by Democrats. These findings are 
consistent with my expectations and previous issue ownership research.  
Given of the salience of the economy during the 2008-10 election cycle, I 
expected performance issues (including the economy) to account for a substantial 
portion of state party platforms. The results are consistent with my expectations; 
performance issues accounted for a significant portion of state party platform content, 
particularly for the Democrats. Democratic state party platforms addressed 
performance issues are more than twice the rate as they addressed Republican owned 
issues. Interestingly, Republican state party platforms addressed performance issues 
and Democratic owned issues at nearly the same rate (Figure 14).  
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Previous research testing issue ownership theory at the national level 
consistently finds that Republicans have an innate advantage because the issues most 
salient in national elections are owned by Republican. As a result, Democrats feel 
compelled to trespass onto Republican owned issues and Republicans focus on their 
owned issues more consistently. At the state level, these findings are reversed. 
Democratic state party platforms focus on issues their party owns more consistently 
than their Republican brethren. Unlike their national counterparts, state Republican 
parties are more likely to trespass onto Democratic owned issues. Seeing Democrats 
adhere to issue ownership expectations more consistently in the states, while 
Republicans are more consistent nationally highlights the importance of understanding 
how political parties behave beyond the national stage. The political conditions and the 
environmental pressures in the states vary, resulting in varied behavioral patterns. This 
intriguing finding may be the result of varying saliencies at the national and state levels. 
The issues most salient at the national level are typically owned by Republicans, while 
the issue areas states are most involved in are owned by the Democrats. If the results 
hold over time we will have a better understanding of how and why state political 
parties diverge from their national counterparts. 
Chapter 6 
As anticipated, Republican state party platforms emphasis traditional moral 
policy positions like opposition to same-sex marriage, condemnation of abortion access, 
and defense of abstinence before marriage. Likewise, Democratic state party platforms 
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emphasized progressive morality policy positions like widespread access to 
contraception, medical privacy rights, and opposition to sexual orientation 
discrimination. In addition, I find that state Republicans from more conservative states 
dedicate larger portions of their platforms to morality politics than their Democratic 
counterparts or their Republican colleagues in more liberal states. Not only are the 
patterns of morality politics influenced by partisan labels, but the ideological climate of 
the state influences party behavior.  
Some of the most remarkable patterns seen in the treatment of morality politics 
are not related to the amount of space dedicated to these issues, but rather the way in 
which the issues are discussed. Democratic state party platforms are significantly more 
likely to carefully balance their progressive policy preferences with conservative party 
interests. Even where Democratic platforms clearly express support for abortion rights, 
the supportive stance frequently occurs alongside a statement acknowledging those 
who believe differently and expressing respect for diverse views. In contrast, Republican 
state party platforms are more likely to express strong, unambiguous policy stances, 
without hedging. These patterns highlight intra-party divisions and ideological variation 
among the Democrats that are not apparent in state Republican parties. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Previous analyses of party platforms have focused on the national party 
platforms and neglected state party platforms almost entirely. The existing research on 
state party platforms is similarly inadequate due to a narrow focus on platform 
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ideology. This study is a first step towards a better understanding of the behavior and 
roles played by state political parties in the United States. By building upon the 
successful coding system developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project researchers, 
I am able to provide a more explicit description of state party platforms than previous 
researchers. Even with this advance, more work remains to be done. Future research 
can build upon this work to investigate the behavior of state parties over time, examine 
the language used in state party platforms for insight into the parties’ policy positions, 
assess the relationship between state parties and campaigns, and test the impact of 
state party platforms on institutions and policy outcomes.  
State Party Platforms Over Time 
This analysis should be expanded to examine state party platforms over time. 
While this analysis is unique in its depth, going beyond simple measures of ideology, and 
the conclusions drawn are compelling, it is only a snapshot. When examining state party 
platforms over time, researchers will be able to ascertain how state party platforms 
change over time in response to electoral wins or losses, and the degree to which public 
opinion trends prompt state parties to add, remove, or rephrase platform language. 
There is evidence that platforms reflect the true values of party activists and tracing the 
reactions of state parties to negative public feedback regarding specific policy planks 
would be a valuable step forward in our understanding of state party behavior. When 
faced with public opposition, will the parties remain true to their values, despite public 
dissent, or will they buckle under public pressure and alter the unpopular planks? When 
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the political environment of the state changes, do state parties simply drop the 
offending planks, taking no official position, as Arkansas Democrats did in 2006? 
Analysis over time will also provide insight into the degree that national party 
platforms draw inspiration from their state counterparts, and vice versa. As state parties 
shift their issue focus and alter their policy positions, do the national parties seek to 
accommodate these changes? Over time, do the platforms of state parties fall in line 
with national party platforms, or does the inconsistency remain? I will be able to 
address these questions with a dataset expanded over time. 
The Language of State Party Platforms 
While this project digs deeper into state party platforms than existing studies 
that rely on simple ideological measures, more can be done. My analysis helps us 
understand the parties’ relative focus on issue areas at the state and national levels, 
helping to uncover the degree to which state parties behave independently of their 
national counterparts. In a similar vein, language analysis would allow us to better 
compare state platforms to national platforms to see the degree to which they profess 
consistent policy preferences.  
To understand the frequency with which state parties focus on social welfare 
issues is an important step. Political speech - in stump speeches, campaign 
advertisements, and party platforms – often relies on vague statements with few 
substantive policy details. Generic calls to improve public education, reduce corruption 
in government, and defend the national borders are common in party platforms. 
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However, specific details on how to accomplish these laudable goals are far less 
common. When state parties offer more specific suggestions, we can see that there is a 
broad range of policy preferences among the states. Future research should attempt to 
ascertain the degree to which state parties operating under Democratic and Republican 
labels express support for common policies. 
Party Platforms and Political Campaigns 
Although Americans typically are portrayed as woefully uninformed and 
politically disengaged, there is evidence that party platforms can help citizens better 
understand what the parties stand for. While members of the general public rarely 
consult party platforms directly, it appears that campaigns focus on issues and themes 
consistent with platforms. Further analysis would allow us to compare the focus and 
content of platforms to the issues addressed most often and the specific policy positions 
offered by state candidates in speeches, campaign advertisements, and legislative 
proposals once in office. These results would assist researchers in tying state party 
behavior to the behavior of individual candidates. 
Party Platforms and Institutional Behavior 
Previous research suggests that national party platforms can help predict the 
policy behavior of successful presidential candidates, more so than Congressional 
candidates. In some ways, this is not surprising. Because there is only one executive 
candidate for office, they should be able to push for a singular, consistent ideology in 
the national platform. Congressional candidates on the other hand are numerous and 
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often hold contradictory policy preferences. At a minimum, Congressional candidates 
are going to disagree on which issue areas they want to emphasize most, given their 
diverse constituencies. We could use state party platforms to better understand the 
behavior of state officials during campaigns and in office. Does the same pattern of 
executive over legislative consistency exist at the state level as well? That is, are 
legislators or state executive officers more consistent with state party platforms? 
Governors and state legislators are not the only public officials in the states 
whose behavior could be better understood in relation to party values. Some states use 
popular elections to select state-level judges. Although judges are guided by the law, 
our legal structure leaves ample room for outside forces to influence judicial behavior. 
Researchers could use state party platforms to identify patterns of partisan behavior in 
state judges, elected in partisan and non-partisan elections. 
Morality Politics 
I chose to focus my analysis on morality policies because they are highly salient, 
technically simple, and deal with our core values as individuals and society. My analysis 
provides the most thorough examinations of morality policies in state party platforms, 
but much work remains. My analysis is among the first to distinguish between 
traditional and progressive emphases of morality policies in state party platforms. 
Knowing that some Republican state parties dedicate large proportions of their 
platforms to traditional moral policies while others only mention such policies in passing 
is a valuable finding. The salience of issues tells us a great deal, but the degree to which 
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state parties are willing to stake out unambiguous policy positions can enhance our 
understanding of state parties, in relation to one another and in relation to their 
national counterparts. The deeper analysis I recommend for morality policies would be 
equally valuable if applied to social welfare policies or even economic policy. 
A more precise analysis of the language used in state party platforms would help 
us understand policy consistency between state parties and future research should 
attempt to distinguish between strong and weak policy positions. If we were to develop 
a system for placing each policy position on a continuum from extreme conservative to 
extreme liberal, we would have a better understanding of the true policy positions of 
state parties. This analysis takes only the first step towards this type of comprehensive 
understanding by uncovering the attention state parties devote to traditional and 
progressive morality policies. 
Conclusion 
My findings underscore the need to expand our assessments of party politics in 
America to better incorporate the significance of state political parties. While the parties 
reflect their national counterparts in the broad strokes, there is meaningful variation 
between state and national parties, and the state parties vary significantly from one 
another. Despite the strength of our two-party system and the inability of third parties 
to break through, our party system is characterized by dramatic decentralization and 
considerably inconsistencies. I hope that this analysis can serve as a blueprint for further 
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and more extensive research on state political parties and their impact on American 
politics.  
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APPENDIX A 
CODING PROCEDURES FOR US STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
The coding unit in any given program is the ‘quasi-sentence,’ defined as an 
argument. An argument is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue. In its 
simplest form, a sentence is the basic unit of meaning. Therefore, punctuation is used as 
the most important guideline for identifying arguments. In its shortest form, a sentence 
contains a subject, a verb, and an attribute or adjective: 
We want worldwide peace. 
We will reduce our military forces. 
Obviously, these two sentences contain two different arguments which are easy 
to identify and to distinguish. But unfortunately, languages are more complex, and it is a 
question of style how to express the same political ideas: 
We want worldwide peace and will reduce our military forces. 
In this case, the two statements are combined into one sentence but for our 
purposes they should be still treated as two different arguments.  
A list of arguments, sometimes marked with hyphens or dots, is treated as if 
separated by full stops:  
In international policy we shall take new initiatives. We will: 
o promote peace; 
o ban chemical weapons; 
o begin discussions for the removal of nuclear bases; 
o increase aid to developing countries; 
o take action to protect the status of refugees. 
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“Now a new historical period has begun – a period in which Russia 
should be cleansed from obscurantism and evil foreign and inner forces, a 
period of its revival as a great superpower, strong and peaceful, and 
democratic, free and prosperous, setting the whole world an example of 
real civilization and strong spirituality.“(Russia, LDPR 2003). 
At first sight, this sentence seems to contain arguments about peace, 
democracy, freedom, prosperity and various others. However, the overall argument 
here is patriotism. Accordingly, this sentence is not cut up. 
Decision Rule No 1: Identifying Quasi- Sentences 
1. Copy the respective party program into the left column of a 
table with 2 columns, leave the right column for the codings (see section 
5). Then, 2. start with reading the first paragraph, 3. look at each 
sentence of the first paragraph, 4. identify the number of arguments and 
transform them into (quasi-)sentences, and 5. mark all (quasi-)sentences 
in the first paragraph as shown in sample texts in section 5. Always think 
twice before you cut a sentence into several quasi-sentences. Always read 
the sentence again and consider whether there is a comprehensive 
argument that catches the meaning of those aspects that could be 
considered separately. 
Some parts of the manifesto, like statistics, tables of content and section 
headings are not considered as text to be coded and, therefore, do not count as quasi-
sentences. Introductory remarks by party leaders are equally ignored since the ideal-
type of a manifesto is defined as authoritative statements of parties. All the other parts 
of a manifesto constitute the basis of analysis. The total number of units of analysis 
equals the total number of quasi-sentences identified for the relevant text of a given 
manifesto. 
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Decision Rule No 2: Classifying the Quasi-Sentences 
Read the whole of the first paragraph before you start coding the 
first quasi-sentence because the context may give you hints how to code 
an otherwise ambiguous argument. Look to see whether one of the 56 
categories definitely captures the sense of the first identified quasi-
sentence and note down the respective number of the category in the 
right column of the table or at the margin of the page. Repeat this 
procedure for all the quasi-sentences of the first paragraph. Then proceed 
with the next paragraph by repeating step no 1. 
To prevent unitising mistakes, Commandment No. 1 spells out that whenever 
coding units are in doubt, the respective sentence must be coded twice, in two logically 
different rounds, and the two solutions for unitising have to be cross-checked before a 
final decision is taken on breaking up a sentence into quasi-sentences. In a first round, 
coders should choose one code for the overarching preference of the whole sentence 
and finish the coding of all the sentences of the whole paragraph or section. In the 
second round, a separate row of codes for the quasi-sentences will be added. The 
inference from both rows of codes should then be compared to the qualitative 
arguments. For example, let us suppose that a sentence-based coding of a paragraph or 
section produces 6 codes, 3 for welfare state expansion and 3 for environmental 
protection, whereas a quasi-sentence-based coding of the same paragraph or section 
produces 12 codes with 3 for welfare state expansion and 9 for environmental 
protection. The sentence-based coding paints the picture of a party that is equally in 
favour of welfare and environment, whereas the quasi-sentence-based coding leaves 
the impression of a party overwhelmingly concerned with the environment. These 
different impressions can then be compared to the arguments given in the whole 
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section. The quantitative codes should give a balanced view; they should ‘mirror’ the 
qualitative arguments as far as possible.  
a. No category seems to apply 
The coding frame was created to capture the total manifesto content. 
Nonetheless, it may be that no category is available for a particular problem in a 
particular country. These quasi-sentences are treated as uncodable (000). It is important 
to realize that ‘uncoded’ does not necessarily mean that a sentence is devoid of 
meaning (although of course it may be); only that it cannot be fitted into the present 
coding frame. However, Commandment No. 2 is that sentences should be coded if at all 
possible. To follow this there are a number of specific decision rules on how to tackle 
with difficult coding decisions. 
In many countries some of the categories are not much used (for instance (405) 
‘Corporatism’ and (409) ‘Keynesian Demand Management’), but are vital for 
comparative reasons. Therefore, some categories may be left empty at the end of the 
coding procedure. On the other hand seldom used categories are the most difficult to 
handle. 
Decision Rule No 4: Checking Definitions of all Categories in Policy 
Domains 
Whenever tempted to treat a quasi-sentence as uncodable, read 
the definitions of categories in the relevant policy domains once again 
because it might well be that the quasi-sentence contains a policy 
position that is taken only seldom. Therefore, the specific definition of the 
respective category may just have been forgotten. 
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A quasi-sentence may be without meaning but may nevertheless be part of the 
discussion of a problem and have a stylistic or linking function, for example: 
‘The next government will do everything in its power to defend the 
interests of the farmers. To this end, we envisage several measures. 
Firstly, we will increase payments of all kinds to farmers. ...’ 
These are three quasi-sentences. The middle sentence itself is devoid of any 
policy-content but is a part of the same argument. Therefore, category (703) 
‘Agriculture’ is coded three times. 
Decision Rule No 5: Identifying Connecting Sentences 
Some sentences, which may otherwise be uncodable, may just be 
connecting sentences between two arguments (for instance: Therefore, 
we are going to do three things.) These connecting sentences themselves 
do not constitute meaningful arguments but are part of an ongoing 
argument. Therefore, connecting sentences should be coded in the same 
category as surrounding sentences or as the bulk of the paragraph they 
appear in. 
Because of the general commandment to classify quasi-sentences if at all 
possible, all quasi-sentences treated as uncodable must be checked again after coding 
the total program.  
b. More than one category seems to apply 
The opposite difficulty arises if more than one category seems to apply. The 
Standard Classification Scheme was developed to cover the whole content of election 
programs. Election programs do not only mention policy preferences, but also include 
preferences about the polity and the politics of the country. The term ‘polity’ refers to 
the institutional dimension of political systems, covering all political institutions such as 
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electoral rules and principles of decision making as well as the organisations of interest 
intermediation and governance. The term ‘politics’ refers to all processes of interest 
intermediation and governance. A classification scheme covering the whole content of 
national election programs should also allow for coding these polity and politics 
preferences. Some categories such as (203) ‘Constitutionalism: Positive’ and (204) 
‘Constitutionalism: Negative’ address the polity, others such as (303) ‘Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency: Positive’ address politics, still others such as (301) 
‘Decentralisation: Positive’ and (302) ‘Centralisation: Positive’ include polity, politics, as 
well as policy issues.  
The problem of multiple coding solutions occurs when polity, politics, and/or 
policy arguments are combined into one sentence:  
‘Because we want worldwide peace, we will add this goal to our 
constitution.’ 
In this case, the polity is merely a means to achieve a policy goal. This difficulty 
can be dealt with by applying the following decision rules:  
Decision Rule No 6: Policy Goals “Beat” Politics, Polity, and Policy Means  
Whenever a sentence combines the means with the achievement 
of a policy goal, the policy goal is to be chosen. 
These general decision rules often apply to the following specific choices:  
Decision Rule No 7: Specific Policy Positions “Beat” (303) ‘Efficiency’  
Whenever there is a choice between category (303) 
‘Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive’, defined as the 
need for efficiency and economy in government and administration, and 
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another policy category from Domains 1 to 7, the specific policy position is 
to be chosen. 
Decision Rule No 8: Specific Policy Positions ‘Beat’ (305) ‘Political 
Authority’ 
Whenever there is a choice between category (305) ‘Political 
Authority’, defined as the party’s general competence to govern or the 
general critique of opponent parties’ com-petence, on the one hand and 
another category from Policy Domains 1 to 7, the specific policy position is 
to be chosen. 
And example for the rule that policy goals beat policy means is provided by the 
following sentence: 
“We will achieve world wide peace by disarmament.” 
The argument in this sentence is ‘Peace’ (106), not ‘Military Negative’ (105). The 
problem of choosing between two categories also occurs with respect to group politics, 
for instance: ‘We want more social security for workers’. In this case, category (701) 
‘Labour Groups’ or category (504) ‘Welfare State Expansion’ may apply. 
Decision Rule No 9: Specific Policy Positions ‘Beat’ Group Politics except 
Group (703) ‘Agriculture’ 
Whenever there is a choice between a specific policy position 
given in Policy Domains 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 on the one hand and a social 
group from Domain 7 on the other hand, take the specific policy position. 
This rule does not apply to category (703) ‘Agriculture’. All quasi-
sentences devoted to agriculture are to be coded into category 703, even 
if a specific policy position such as (402) ‘Incentives’ or (410) ‘Economic 
Growth’ is taken to further the interests of farmers. Whenever agriculture 
is positively mentioned, code 703 has to be used. 
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In addition to the aforementioned cases of choice, there is one category, (408) 
‘General Economic Goals’, which is non-positional and should, therefore, be avoided if 
possible.  
Decision Rule No 10: Specific Policy Positions ‘Beat’ (408) ‘General 
Economic Goals’ 
Whenever there is a choice between a more specific policy position 
given in Policy Domains 1 to 7 and category (408) ‘General Economic 
Goals’, the specific policy positions (for instance (410) ‘Economic Growth’) 
is to be chosen instead of 408. 
Even after applying these decision rules, one may still not be sure where an 
argument is leading. In many cases, section headings can be used to make a decision:  
Decision Rule No 11: Section Headings as Guidelines 
Look at the section heading of the quasi-sentence in question. 
Then, take the category which covers the topic of the section or the 
heading. Thus, section headings are taken as guidelines for coding 
although section headings themselves are not to be coded. 
Many of these problems may be solved by taking the context of the ambiguous 
quasi-sentence into account. Coders should first of all study the sentences that follow 
because the first quasi-sentence may be part of an argument explicated in the next 
sentences. Therefore, it is always useful to start the coding procedure by reading the 
whole paragraph.  
For all other cases in which more than one category seems to apply, the coder 
has to decide what the most important concern of the argument is since one, and only 
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one, category has to be chosen for each argument. There is only one exception to the 
‘one-and only one’ rule: 
Decision Rule No 12: European Level and National Level 
Policies at the European level may be discussed with respect to 
their impact at the national level. In these cases, (108) ‘European 
Community: positive’ or (110) ‘European Community: negative’ as well as 
the specific national position in Policy Domains 2 to 7 have to be coded. 
Just as with unitising (see p. 8), scoring problems often occur with the 
introductory parts and the summary of long programs as well as with short programs. In 
both cases, many arguments are typically condensed into very few sentences, often 
containing numerous commas and semicolons. In case of such difficulties, the rest of the 
manifesto should be coded before the introductory part is tackled as this will give hints 
on how to solve the riddles of the introductory sentences.  
In case of very short programs with just one to five pages, unitising and scoring 
decisions concerning a few sentences can change the result of the content analysis. 
Therefore, the following decision rule should be applied:  
Decision Rule No 13: Double-check each Code Chosen for Short 
Manifestos  
Short manifestos have to be coded twice because each coding 
decision is particularly crucial. In case of short programs, make sure that 
no argument is neglected due to deci-sion rules 6 to 10. Make sure that 
the numerical coding solution mirrors all qualitative arguments given in 
such short programs, even if they are hidden in subordinate clauses 
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c. The statement seems unclear 
Even after applying Decision Rules No 1 to 13, one may still not be sure where an 
argument is leading. Many of these problems may be solved by taking the context of the 
ambiguous quasi-sentence into account. Coders should first of all take into account the 
following sentences because the first (quasi-) sentence may be part of an argument 
which is explicated in the next sentences. Therefore, it is always useful to start the 
coding procedure by reading the whole paragraph. 
In some cases, crucial decisions have to be made with respect to the manifest or 
latent content of statements. No inferences should be made with respect to the 
meaning of statements. The coder has to code what the statement says, not what he or 
she thinks it may lead to in the end. Thus, if a party claims that a measure favours 
employees, (701) ‘Labour Groups: Positive’ has to be coded although you may feel sure 
that it is to their detriment.  
As with uncodable sentences, all unclear statements should be marked and 
reread at the end of coding. The reason is that many statements which may be 
uncodable at first sight may become clear in the context of the whole program. 
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APPENDIX B 
CODING SCHEME FOR US STATE PARTY PLATFORMS 
Policy Domain 1: External Relations 
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 
Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country 
has a special relationship. For example, in the British case: former colonies; in the 
Swedish case: the rest of Scandinavia; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such 
countries. 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 
Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has 
a special relationship; otherwise as 101, but negative. 
103 Anti-Imperialism 
Negative references to exerting strong influence (political, military or 
commercial) over other states; negative references to controlling other countries as if 
they were part of an empire; favourable mentions of de-colonisation; favourable 
references to greater self-government and independence for colonies; negative 
references to the imperial behaviour of the manifesto and/or other countries. 
104 Military: Positive 
Need to maintain or increase military expenditure; modernising armed forces 
and improvement in military strength; rearmament and self-defence; need to keep 
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military treaty obligations; need to secure adequate manpower in the military; 
importance external security. 
105 Military: Negative 
Favourable mentions of decreasing military expenditures; disarmament; ‘evils of 
war’; promises to reduce conscription; otherwise as 104, but negative. 
106 Peace 
Peace as a general goal; declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of 
solving crises; desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries. 
107 Internationalism: Positive 
Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other 
than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning 
of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world 
state; support for UN. 
109 Internationalism: Negative 
Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to 
internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative. 
Policy Domain  2: Freedom and Democracy 
201 Freedom and Human Rights 
Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; 
freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the 
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political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other 
countries. 
202 Democracy 
Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other 
organisations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making as well as generalised 
support for the manifesto country’s democracy. 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive 
Support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an 
argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing 
things. 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative 
Opposition to the constitution in general or to specific aspects; otherwise as 203, 
but negative. 
Policy Domain 3: Political System 
301 Decentralisation 
Support for federalism or devolution; more regional autonomy for policy or 
economy; support for keeping up local and regional customs and symbols; favourable 
mentions of special consideration for local areas; deference to local expertise; 
favourable mentions of the territorial subsidiary principle. 
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302 Centralisation 
Opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels; support for more 
centralisation in political and administrative procedures; otherwise as 301, but negative. 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 
Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting 
down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make the 
process of government and administration cheaper and more effective. 
304 Political Corruption 
Need to eliminate corruption, and associated abuse, in political and public life. 
305 Political Authority 
Favourable mentions of strong government, including government stability; 
manifesto party’s competence to govern and/or other party’s lack of such competence. 
Policy Domain 4: Economy 
401 Free Enterprise 
Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual 
enterprise over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private property 
rights, personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises. 
402 Incentives 
Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start 
enterprises; need for financial and other incentives such as subsidies. 
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403 Market Regulation 
Need for regulations designed to make private enterprises work better; actions 
against monopolies and trusts, and in defence of consumer and small business; 
encouraging economic competition; social market economy. 
404 Economic Planning 
Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning of a consultative or 
indicative nature, need for government to create such a plan. 
405 Corporatism 
Favourable mentions of the need for the collaboration of employers and trade 
union organisations in overall economic planning and direction through the medium of 
tripartite bodies of government, employers, and trade unions. 
406 Protectionism: Positive 
Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal 
markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions; in favour of 
export subsidies. 
407 Protectionism: Negative 
Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative. 
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408 Economic Goals 
Statements of intent to pursue any economic goals not covered by other 
categories in Domain 4. This category is created to catch an overall interest of parties in 
economics and, therefore, covers a variety of economic goals. 
409 Keynesian Demand Management 
Favourable mentions of demand-oriented economic policy; economic policy 
devoted to the reduction of depressions and/or to increase private demand through 
increasing public demand and/or through increasing social expenditures. 
410 Productivity 
Need to encourage or facilitate greater production; need to take measures to aid 
this; appeal for greater production and importance of productivity to the economy; the 
paradigm of growth. 
411 Technology and Infrastructure 
Importance of modernisation of industry and methods of transport and 
communication; importance of science and technological developments in industry; 
need for training and research. This does not imply education in general (see category 
506). This also covers public spending on infrastructure such as streets and harbours. 
412 Controlled Economy 
General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, 
wages, rents, etc.; state intervention into the economic system. 
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413 Nationalisation 
Favourable mentions of government ownership, partial or complete, including 
government ownership of land. 
414 Economic Orthodoxy 
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. reduction of budget deficits, 
retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions 
such as stock market and banking system; support for strong currency. 
415 Marxist Analysis  
Positive references (typically but not necessary by communist parties) to the 
specific use of Marxist-Leninist terminology and analysis of situations which are 
otherwise uncodable. 
416 Anti-Growth Economy  
Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics and steady state economy; 
sustainable development. 
Policy Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
501 Environmental Protection 
Preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; general preservation of natural 
resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc; 
environmental improvement. 
 
 
158 
 
502 Culture 
Need to provide cultural and leisure facilities including arts and sport; need to 
spend money on museums, art galleries etc.; need to encourage worthwhile leisure 
activities and cultural mass media. 
503 Social Justice 
Concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for 
underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barriers; end of 
discrimination such as racial or sexual discrimination, etc. 
504 Welfare State Expansion 
Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service 
or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or social 
housing. Note: This category excludes education. 
505 Welfare State Limitation 
Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; favourable mentions of 
the social subsidiary principle; otherwise as 504, but negative. 
506 Education Expansion 
Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels. This excludes 
technical training which is coded under 411. 
507 Education Limitation 
Limiting expenditure on education; otherwise as 506, but negative. 
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Policy Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
601 National Way of Life: Positive 
Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order 
to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas. 
602 National Way of Life: Negative 
Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; 
otherwise as 601, but negative. 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; 
religion. 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; 
otherwise as 603, but negative. 
605 Law and Order 
Enforcement of all laws; actions against crime; support and resources for police; 
tougher attitudes in courts; importance of internal security. 
606 Social Harmony 
Appeal for national effort and solidarity; need for society to see itself as united; 
appeal for public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis; support 
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for the public interest; favourable mention of the civil society (Note: This category 
neither captures what your country can do for you nor what you can do for your 
country, but what you can do for your fellow citizens.). 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive  
Favourable mentions of cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and 
pillarization; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the 
country including special educational provisions. 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but 
negative. 
Policy Domain 7: Social Groups 
701 Labour Groups: Positive  
Favourable references to labour groups, working class, unemployed; support for 
trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees. 
702 Labour Groups: Negative 
Negative references to trade unions such as ‘abuse of power’; otherwise as 701, 
but negative. 
703 Agriculture and Farmers 
Support for agriculture and farmers; any policy aimed specifically at benefiting 
these. 
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704 Middle Class and Professional Groups 
Favourable references to middle class, professional groups, such as physicians or 
lawyers; old and new middle class. 
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups 
Favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in 
economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants, 
etc. 
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups 
Favourable mentions of, or need for, assistance to women, old people, young 
people, linguistic groups, etc; special interest groups of all kinds. 
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APPENDIX C 
FLORIDA REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM 
GOP Principles 
I Believe… The proper function of government is to do for the people those 
things that have to be done but cannot be done, or cannot be done as well, by 
individuals, and that the most effective government is government closest to the 
people. 
I Believe… Good government is based upon the individual and that each person's 
ability, dignity, freedom, and responsibility must be honored and recognized. 
I Believe… The free enterprise and the encouragement of individual initiative and 
incentive have given this nation an economic system second to none. 
I Believe… Sound money management should be our goal. 
I Believe… In equal right, equal justice and equal opportunity for all, regardless of 
race, creed, age, sex or national origin. 
I Believe… We must retain those principles of the past worth retaining, yet 
always be receptive to new ideas with an outlook broad enough to accommodate 
thoughtful change and varying points of view. 
I Believe… That Americans value and should preserve their feeling of national 
strength and pride, and at the same time share with people everywhere a desire for 
peace and freedom and the extension of human rights throughout the world. 
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I Believe… The Republican Party is the best vehicle for translating these ideals 
into positive and successful principles of government. 
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APPENDIX D 
STATA DO-FILE FOR CHAPTER 4 
** This do file has all of the code for the issue ownership chapter. Use the file 
named: Issue Ownership Data.** 
** First, there are 6 tests of IO theory. Use the Democratic SPP sheet and the 
Republican SPP sheet and run all 6 tests separately. This will indicate what percentage of 
coding units in each state party platform address each set of issues - D-owned, R-
owned, performance, or other.** 
*****Issue Ownership Test 1 - simple test, categories divided by me***** 
** Generate variables for Dem-owned, Rep-owned, and performance issues. 
Economic issues are coded with appropriate party.** 
gen IODem1 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416) 
gen IORep1 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per401 +per505 +per507 
+per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 +per414 +per508) 
gen IOPerf1 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410) 
gen IOOther1 = (per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per411 +per415 
+per601 +per602 +per706) 
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** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category.** 
gen total1 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416 +per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 
+per401 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 
+per414 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410 +per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per411 +per415 +per601 +per602 
+per706) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus = (IODem1 / total1) 
summarize Dfocus 
gen Rfocus = (IORep1 / total1) 
summarize Rfocus 
gen Perffocus = (IOPerf1 / total1) 
summarize Perffocus 
gen Ofocus = (IOOther1 / total1) 
summarize Ofocus 
*****Issue Ownership Test 2 - simple test, categories divided by me, with 
economic issues moved from D & R to Performance. Economic issues in "other" left 
alone***** 
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** Generate variables for owned issues and performance issues, but economic 
issues from Dem and Rep categories are coded as performance.** 
gen IODem2 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302 + per501+ per502 + 
per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ per701+ per703+ per704+ per705) 
gen IORep2 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per505 +per507 +per603 
+per605 +per608 +per702 + per200 +per508) 
gen IOPerf2 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410+ per403+ per412+ per413+per407+ per 416+ per401 +per402 +per406 +per414) 
gen IOOther2 = (per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per411 +per415 
+per601 +per602 +per706) 
** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category.** 
gen total2 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416 +per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 
+per401 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 
+per414 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410 +per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per411 +per415 +per601 +per602 
+per706) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus2 = (IODem2 / total2) 
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summarize Dfocus2 
gen Rfocus2 = (IORep2 / total2) 
summarize Rfocus2 
gen Perffocus2 = (IOPerf2 / total2) 
summarize Perffocus2 
gen Ofocus2 = (IOOther2 / total2) 
summarize Ofocus2 
*****Issue Ownership Test 3 - ALL economic issues are moved to the 
performance category***** 
** Generate variables for owned and performance issues, but all economic 
issues are coded as performance, even from the "other" category.** 
gen IODem3 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302 + per501+ per502 + 
per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ per701+ per703+ per704+ per705) 
gen IORep3 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per505 +per507 +per603 
+per605 +per608 +per702 + per200 +per508) 
gen IOPerf3 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410+ per403+ per412+ per413+per407+ per 416+ per401 +per402 +per406 
+per414+per411 +per415) 
gen IOOther3 = (per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per601 +per602 
+per706) 
** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category.** 
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gen total3 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416 +per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 
+per401 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 
+per414 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410 +per202 +per203 +per204 +per304 +per305 +per411 +per415 +per601 +per602 
+per706) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus3 = (IODem3 / total3) 
summarize Dfocus3 
gen Rfocus3 = (IORep3 / total3) 
summarize Rfocus3 
gen Perffocus3 = (IOPerf3 / total3) 
summarize Perffocus3 
gen Ofocus3 = (IOOther3 / total3) 
summarize Ofocus3 
*****Issue Ownership Test 4 - simple test, categories divided by me (excludes 
“other category)***** 
** Generate variables for Dem-owned, Rep-owned, and performance issues. 
Economic issues are coded with appropriate party.** 
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gen IODem4 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416) 
gen IORep4 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per401 +per505 +per507 
+per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 +per414 +per508) 
gen IOPerf4 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410) 
** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category.** 
gen total4 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416 +per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 
+per401 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 
+per414 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus4 = (IODem4 / total4) 
summarize Dfocus4 
gen Rfocus4 = (IORep4 / total4) 
summarize Rfocus4 
gen Perffocus4 = (IOPerf4 / total4) 
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summarize Perffocus4 
*****Issue Ownership Test 5 - simple test, categories divided by me, with 
economic issues moved from D & R to Performance. Economic issues in "other" left 
alone (excludes “other category)***** 
** Generate variables for owned issues and performance issues, but economic 
issues from Dem and Rep categories are coded as performance.**  
gen IODem5 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302 + per501+ per502 + 
per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ per701+ per703+ per704+ per705) 
gen IORep5 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per505 +per507 +per603 
+per605 +per608 +per702 + per200 +per508) 
gen IOPerf5 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410+ per403+ per412+ per413+per407+ per 416+ per401 +per402 +per406 +per414) 
** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category. 
gen total5 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302 + per501+ per502 + 
per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ per701+ per703+ per704+ per705 
+per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 
+ per200 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410+ per403+ per412+ per413+per407+ per 416+ per401 +per402 +per406 +per414) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus5 = (IODem5 / total5) 
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summarize Dfocus5 
gen Rfocus5 = (IORep5 / total5) 
summarize Rfocus5 
gen Perffocus5 = (IOPerf5 / total5) 
summarize Perffocus5 
*****Issue Ownership Test 6 - ALL economic issues are moved to the 
performance category (excludes “other category)***** 
** Generate variables for owned and performance issues, but all economic 
issues are coded as performance, even from the "other" category.** 
gen IODem6 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302 + per501+ per502 + 
per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ per701+ per703+ per704+ per705) 
gen IORep6 = (per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 +per505 +per507 +per603 
+per605 +per608 +per702 + per200 +per508) 
gen IOPerf6 = (per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410+ per403+ per412+ per413+per407+ per 416+ per401 +per402 +per406 
+per414+per411 +per415) 
** Generate variable for the denominator - to determine % that falls into each 
category.** 
gen total6 = (per103+ per105+ per107+ per201+ per302+ per403+ per412+ 
per413+ per501+ per502 + per503 +per504+ per506+ per604+ per606+ per607+ 
per701+ per703+ per704+ per705+per407+ per 416 +per104 +per109 +per301 +per303 
+per401 +per505 +per507 +per603 +per605 +per608 +per702 +per402 +per406+ per200 
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+per414 +per508 +per101 +per102 +per106 +per404 +per405 +per408 +per409 + 
per410 +per411 +per415) 
** Generate % of coding units in platform focusing on each category of issues. 
Denominator is the sum of all coding categories** 
gen Dfocus6 = (IODem6 / total6) 
summarize Dfocus6 
gen Rfocus6 = (IORep6 / total6) 
summarize Rfocus6 
gen Perffocus6 = (IOPerf6 / total6) 
summarize Perffocus6 
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